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Planning for a Productive Paradise

Tom McCall and the Conservationist Tale of Oregon Land-Use Policy

WHEN OREGON GOVERNOR Thomas Lawson McCall took office in 1967, the state’s economic development quarterly was titled Grow with Oregon — a seemingly innocuous name for an era when many Americans still envisioned a future of limitless opportunities. Surely Oregon would want to be part of that journey. McCall, however, had other ideas. In 1970, he changed the publication’s name to Oregon Quality. By 1973, it was named Oregon Progress. McCall would later specifically highlight this decision in his 1977 autobiography.¹ McCall’s interest in transforming growth into quality and then progress illustrates important links between his vision for the future of Oregon and a deeper historical understanding of government’s proper role in fostering economic development. Growth implies a world without limits. Quality requires careful planning to maximize resources. Progress requires both quality planning and the foresight to avoid unintended consequences. McCall’s promulgation of the latter values illustrates important connections between his intentions around resource stewardship and those of his forebears within the progressive wing of the Republican Party. Oregon’s new governor served as a standard-bearer, carrying Progressive Era understandings of conservation into the 1970s-era “age of limits.”²

Republican president and Progressive Era exemplar Theodore Roosevelt once reported that in the realm of conservation, he intended to “replace his predecessors’ ‘government by inaction’ with his own brand of ‘government by intuition,’ doing what his heart told him must be done.” He asserted, “the conservation of our natural resources and their proper use constitute the fundamental problem which underlies almost every other problem of our
national life’.” Such language would have sounded very familiar to readers of Democratic politician Stewart Udall’s The Quiet Crisis in the 1960s or to those hearing coverage of Democrat Washington Sen. Henry M. Jackson’s crusade for land-use planning legislation on a national level. It would also, however, have sounded quite familiar to Oregonians. During a period of considerable Republican Party flux, McCall articulated a vision tied to the Republican Party politics of the Progressive Era — and he was not alone in his efforts. What succeeded in Oregon failed to triumph on a federal level, but McCall’s activism helps demonstrate the endurance of Republican Party politics that emphasized wise use and careful planning to generate progress in place of mere growth.

A longtime Portland-area broadcaster, McCall became secretary of state in 1964 and won the governorship in 1966. Perhaps his most famous
utterance came in 1971, when he informed CBS News reporter Terry Drinkwater in a nationally televised interview that tourists should “come and visit [Oregon] again and again. This is a state of excitement. But for heaven’s sake, don’t come here to live.” Some state business leaders were displeased with their larger-than-life governor’s very public pronouncement. McCall later reflected that he knew he was “impugning Western hospitality, which is equated with God and motherhood,” but as his biographer Brent Walth aptly concluded, he did not care — he wanted to shock people, and he succeeded. More importantly, however, McCall’s infamous statement represented a more flamboyant articulation of the impulse that led him to rename the economic development report. McCall was deeply concerned that the path of unbridled growth would despoil his beloved Oregon and the nation as a whole. An advocate of enlightened planning, McCall saw Oregon as a testing ground for policies that could become national standards. His was not a politics of preservation in the sense eventually adopted by many in the movement we would label “environmentalist” today. Rather, McCall’s environmental politics trace a remarkably straight path from Theodore Roosevelt’s Pro-
gressive Era ideals, situating natural resources at the heart of governmental planning.

McCall was not alone in his party. The Nixon years were also the years of the Clean Air and Water acts, the foundation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and governmental cooperation in observing the first Earth Day. Russell Train, an environmental activist, Executive Office adviser, EPA administrator, and a self-described “moderate conservative,” convinced the president that “quality of life” issues captured the interest of a growing swath of the electorate and could be used as a unifying force. Nixon’s environmentalism was therefore based in political considerations rather than personal commitment. Train’s commitment to environmental activism, however, displays the potential that existed in the 1970s for Republican — even conservative Republican — political philosophy to follow an environmental track:

To my mind, to oppose environmental protection is not to be truly conservative. To put short-term financial gain ahead of the long-term health of the environment is a fundamentally radical policy, as well as being unethical. Conservation, which is essentially no more and no less than protection of the natural capital with which we have been endowed, should be seen as truly conservative.

Train’s allusion to “protection” of “natural capital” resonates with McCall’s environmental philosophy of preservation for use and provision for the future. Ultimately, the environmental vision of Republicans such as McCall and Train fell by the wayside. Nixon’s successors determined that the negative political effects of conservation advocacy outweighed the positive potential, closing the final window of opportunity for Progressive-style Republican environmental politics.

Progressive Era Republicans living at the turn of the twentieth century recognized the finite characteristics of the American landscape. Republican leaders were living in an age characterized by historian Frederick Jackson Turner’s 1893 proclamation of the “end of the frontier.” Theirs was an age of limits, much like that McCall and others would encounter by the early 1970s. While restrictions stimulated expansionist tendencies such as imperialism, they also engendered deep interest in preserving America’s resources. Gifford Pinchot, the pioneering American forester, politician, and Roosevelt ally, observed in 1904 that public lands policy should rely on an understanding of the “inter-dependence of its various parts, such as irrigation, forestry, [and] grazing.” In efforts to understand the “best use” of the landscape, Pinchot declared, “knowledge is becoming a principle of action, with the conception of permanent settlement at its base.” Pinchot’s inclusion
of settlement as a goal is significant: Progressives recognized wise utilization of the nation’s resources as a path to more efficient growth within the means nature provided. Quality produced progress. Efficiency required planning. University of Wisconsin economist Richard T. Ely defined conservation as “the preservation in unimpaired efficiency of the resources of the earth.” As Roosevelt put it in 1909: “The same measure of prudence demanded from [a businessman] as an individual, the same measure of foresight demanded from him as an individual, are demanded from us as a nation.”

Progressives balanced their faith in expertise with a commitment to overturning entrenched political interests, and in this realm Oregonians played a leading role. Oregon Progressives such as William U’Ren pushed for citizen involvement through tools including the initiative, referendum, recall, and direct primary elections — a package of reforms that became known as the “Oregon system.” According to the philosophy, experts should undertake planning, but citizens should enjoy a transparent view of its operations, with ample opportunities to make their voices heard.

Many historians of post–World War II environmentalism have articulated a firm line of division between the conservation of the Progressive Era and the environmentalism that emerged from rising concerns about quality of

Gifford Pinchot, pictured here in about 1910, was the first chief of the U.S. Forest Service. A leading ally of President Theodore Roosevelt, Pinchot was perhaps the most prominent conservationist of the Progressive Era.
life during the 1960s. Conservation addressed issues of production, focusing on efficient use of resources, while environmentalism is related to consumption — a growing concern about the potential negative effects of rising standards of living. Char Miller’s biography of Pinchot, however, traces the development of the forester’s conservation thinking from wise management toward growing awareness of the myriad connections between the environment and human health. Even at the height of his resource-focused “conservationist” stage, Pinchot favored “the greatest good, for the greatest number, for the longest run [emphasis added].” A sustainable approach toward managing the nation’s resources produced quality of life, through both the human health that a thriving environment fostered and the resources it could continue to provide American citizens.

McCall’s activism also complicates the notion of a firm line of division between “conservation” and “environmentalism.” For McCall, the phrase quality of life had real, material ramifications, not just for consumers but also for those seeking to productively manage the Oregon landscape — Oregon could not exist for McCall without both production and consumption. While McCall did not ignore consumerist arguments, he was concerned above all with “wise use” of a very different nature than that promulgated by the Sagebrush Rebels of the late 1970s and early 1980s, who
argued that, in the words of historian Brian Allen Drake, “nature existed to be utilized for individual profit.”10 Quality of life, in McCall’s vision, was a product of the land. An ideology of use that included recognition of the land’s inherent value was central to producing urban areas hospitable to the burgeoning technology field, stable agricultural production on the state’s richest farmland, landscapes with tourist potential, fisheries capable of sustained production, and even timber resources that would be here for future generations. As usual, McCall stated his position most colorfully and succinctly: “someone once said that I would take the milk out of the mouths of children, rather than the money out of the fish hatchery. But you know, it’s the fish hatcheries that put the [milk] in the mouths of the children.”11 In other words, conservation drove the economic engine of the state.
belief was evident most clearly in the work McCall did to successfully enact Oregon’s strong land-use planning legislation.

McCall was not alone in his advocacy of the productive value of the Oregon landscape. From a second-generation dairy farmer to a cannery union organizer to a young attorney who grew up in a Washington farming community, key proponents of land-use planning were people who understood the land as a productive entity. The land-use campaign’s genesis was in concerns about the future productive potential of the fertile Willamette Valley, and its strongest support post-passage came from 1000 Friends of Oregon, an organization founded first and foremost to ensure that short-term development interests did not triumph over long-term economic and quality-of-life goals.

Key to understanding McCall and the other major supporters of land-use planning in Oregon is recognition of the false dichotomy between “nature” and “human” that historian William Cronon has so aptly addressed. “Only people whose relation to the land was already alienated,” Cronon writes of some urban elite “wilderness” advocates, “could hold up wilderness as a model for human life in nature, for the romantic ideology of wilderness leaves precisely nowhere for human beings to actually make their living from the land.”

McCall could tilt toward the romantic, and certainly he envisioned Oregon as an example of national renewal, a model of improved governance, care for the environment, and sustainable progress that the rest of the nation should emulate. But McCall was also a child of the western landscape, reared on a central Oregon ranch and deeply aware of the necessities of production. For him, there was little alienation from the land. Oregon — and more broadly, the nation — had been entrusted to its citizens. Proper stewardship meant proper use, and proper use meant conservationist politics for the late twentieth century.

McCall and his administration advocated a wide array of environmental and resource management policies, from clean-up of the Willamette River system that flows through Oregon’s most densely populated corridor to the state’s groundbreaking 1971 Bottle Bill, which imposed the nation’s first deposit-and-return program for recyclable beverage cans and bottles. Oregon environmental politics benefited from strong advocacy within both parties’ leadership. Oregon state treasurer and future Democratic governor Bob Straub advocated similarly forceful protection of the state’s natural resources, at times successfully challenging McCall to adopt more strident proposals or to reverse questionable decisions. While environmental policy was decidedly a team effort, McCall’s unique charisma became a factor in generating policy success. Perhaps the most contentious and long-lasting accomplishment of McCall’s environmental activism is land-use policy, and in particular the
1973 passage of Senate Bill 100, which generated an unprecedented system of statewide planning. The fight for this legislation provides an ideal lens for examining McCall’s long-range perspective and conservationist vision. Contrasting the fate of SB 100 with contemporaneous — failed — federal attempts to inaugurate comprehensive land-use planning demonstrates the strengths and limitations of applying McCall’s approach on a national level and helps identify the effect of changing political and economic factors on environmental legislation. The debate over land use in Oregon was in part a debate about scale: Who should exercise control, over what components of a land-use policy, and at what level? Questions of scale continue to animate the discussion surrounding land-use planning in Oregon. The events leading to passage of SB 100 illustrate how putatively conservative positions regarding devolution of responsibility to the lowest practical level of government and Progressive-style notions of citizen involvement challenged and sometimes triumphed over aspirations for higher-level government control. SB 100 embodied cross-partisan, progressive policy with a Republican flavor — much like its leading proponent.

McCall’s legacy of environmental activism pre-dated his first successful election campaign in 1964. As a reporter for KGW-TV, Portland’s NBC affiliate, he was instrumental in reporting the 1962 documentary *Pollution in Paradise*, a trailblazing commentary on the proliferating dangers to Oregonians’ ways of life from air and water pollution. McCall’s reporting, undertaken mostly off-camera in his familiar stentorian voice, promoted a conservationist vision of wise use. This was not preservationist advocacy; McCall, fellow presenter Richard Ross, and a whole host of state and industry officials ranging from Oregon State University scientists to Gov. Mark Hatfield, advocated carefully planned use of natural resources to both generate income and sustain the environment for future generations.

The debate over land-use policy in Oregon during the 1960s and 1970s took place in a context of several successive waves of growth. World War II inaugurated a tremendous surge of population, generating 18 percent growth between 1940 and 1945 as Americans traveled from all over the country to work in the Portland metropolitan area’s shipyards. Many of them stayed, producing a 40 percent growth rate over the course of the 1940s as soldiers returned and started families that augmented the new migrants’ burgeoning numbers. During the 1950s, Oregon’s population rose by 16 percent, a figure exceeded by the 18 percent growth of the 1960s and dwarfed by the 26 percent growth of the 1970s, as migrants seeking to escape the overcrowded environs of California and other regions set down roots.14

A few decades before, as Progressive Era reformers had focused considerable attention on urban reforms, including replacing spoils-based
machine politicians with nonpartisan city managers and imposing more orderly structures on municipal departments, zoning laws also became an important method for extending order to geographic landscapes. Oregon granted cities the authority to develop plans and land-use regulations in 1919 and 1923. Following an unsuccessful referendum in 1920, the City of Portland approved a simple zoning ordinance in 1924. In 1947, the state extended regulatory authority to counties as well as cities. While zoning protected existing land users from the nuisance of potentially incompatible uses, it failed to provide guidance regarding such important issues as timing, conservation of infrastructure, and broader regional planning. In Oregon, zoning and planning regimes before the late 1960s were voluntary. Zoning existed primarily in cities, and what limited rural zoning existed allowed such “recipes for sprawl” as subdivisions divided into five-acre parcels.

Recognizing the problems posed by increasing sprawl, a Republican dairy farmer and county planning commissioner from the southern Willamette Valley’s Linn County initiated and doggedly pursued the course of organization and study that would lead to SB 100. As the story goes, Hector Macpherson, Jr., drove past his neighbor’s farm one day in the late 1960s and noticed a Caterpillar tractor turning over the soil. “What ya plannin’ to grow here?” he shouted out the window. “Houses,” replied the tractor driver. Apocryphal or actual, the story is essentially true: Macpherson could see a future of conflict and discord in the Willamette Valley’s expanding subdivisions and the shrinking acreage of some of the most productive farmland in the nation. On one occasion, he later recollected, he received a telephone call from a couple who asked him not to spread manure on a section of his land located next to a church the week before they were to be married. “I saw I was going to need protection,” he concluded, “if I was going to maintain my dairy farm.”

The first steps toward more comprehensive land-use legislation stemmed from concern over just the sort of problem Macpherson diagnosed. Between 1961 and 1967, Oregon took limited legislative action to set farmland tax rates by land rental values, rather than by comparative sales data, in an effort to separate valuation of the land’s productive capacity from demand for suburban development. A 1967 conference asking the question “The Willamette Valley: What Is our Future in Land Use?” helped spread awareness of increasing stresses on the valley in particular. Oregon’s Legislative Interim Committee on Agriculture responded by developing Senate Bill 10, the state’s first mandatory planning legislation. Strongly supported by McCall, farmers, and key Republican leaders, SB 10 made Oregon the second state in the nation to require all cities and counties to develop planning guidelines by a certain date — in this case, December 31, 1971. Those fail-
ing to submit plans by the deadline would have a plan imposed on them by the state executive. Still, SB 10 left significant gaps in the state’s ability to adequately provide a comprehensive vision for land-use planning. No funding was provided for enactment of the legislation, and the state encountered difficulties in securing compliance from counties and municipalities. Even so, by January 1973, eighteen of Oregon’s thirty-six counties were in compliance with SB 10. Seven others were deemed to be “making good progress,” and the Local Government Relations Division recommended their deadlines be extended. The division recommended additional action in the case of the remaining counties, although none were labeled as completely intransigent. The regulating body deemed the vast majority of Oregon cities to be in compliance; the few localities rated as wholly noncompliant tended to be small cities, often recently incorporated and containing fewer than 300 people.

A pair of significant new Willamette Valley projects helped to demonstrate SB 10’s limitations. In late 1971, an enormous proposed development southwest of Portland and across the Willamette River from Wilsonville illustrated Oregon’s need for intergovernmental environmental and comprehensive planning. The 477-acre Charbonneau District included a village center, churches, stores and professional buildings, schools, a golf course and leisure center, and 2,000 homes for well-heeled exurbanites. Located on prime agricultural soils and linked to Wilsonville by Interstate 5, district plans showed construction on a potential landslide zone next to the river, and development that would likely disrupt research at Oregon State University’s nearby Agricultural Experiment Station. Waterfront development would destroy the potential for public foot or bicycle paths between planned and extant state parks, and the new neighborhood was likely to raise surrounding farmers’ property values, leading to increased property taxes. Charbonneau developers had, however, planned the district in accordance with all SB 10 guidelines. Between 1969 and 1972, 15,000 acres of Willamette Valley farmland were subjected to development.

In Macpherson’s backyard, a large mall construction firm had plans to build a 650,000-square-foot shopping complex covering over 100 acres of land at the intersection of Interstate 5 and Highway 34. The request came in early 1972, just following completion of the Linn County Planning Commission’s comprehensive plan for SB 10 compliance. While regional leaders harbored few objections to the basic concept, the mall’s suggested placement violated the county’s new plan. The construction firm’s directors explicitly wished to build away from cities and “core area traffic congestion.” The comprehensive plan, however, called for any intensive development to be located in or adjacent to cities for aesthetic reasons and to avoid increased
costs associated with running utilities and expanding road networks for a large retail site outside the extant urban area. County leaders’ reasonable desire for retail growth conflicted with a county plan on which the ink was scarcely dry. Without a more comprehensive state planning regime, there was no higher authority to which opponents or, for that matter, proponents could turn.  

As Oregon officials contended with the likes of Charbonneau and the Linn County shopping complex, questions of growth animated an increasingly robust discussion on the national stage. Richard Lamm of *The New Republic* noted in 1971 that the history of the United States had been a story largely of unrestrained growth. Now, however, the conventional wisdom that
growth represented an unequivocal good was coming into question — and he presented McCall’s renaming of the Oregon Department of Economic Development publication as one indication. Nonetheless, he presented a wide range of evidence indicating the hazards of unbridled growth — and increasing recognition among American policy makers that growth was a serious issue. The “economies of scale” principle, for example, was operating in reverse in many American municipalities, as per-capita rates for providing local services became more expensive in cities with populations over 100,000. Population growth was receiving attention from the very top echelons of government, forming one point of concern in a summer 1970 president’s report on national goals — titled, appropriately, “Toward Balanced Growth: Quantity with Quality.” The Nixon administration’s National Goals Research Staff concluded that while the United States faced little danger from a population explosion, American cities would become increasingly overpopulated without careful planning — namely, pursuit of policies encouraging internal migration and directing new growth toward more sparsely populated rural areas. Importantly, however, seemingly broad consensus for addressing problems of growth masked enduring differences of opinion about the efficacy of governmental control, especially at the federal level. Barry Goldwater, a Republican Arizona senator and conservative stalwart, signed on as cosponsor of a congressional joint resolution favoring zero population growth in 1971. Nevertheless, he and others concerned about negative impacts of growth viewed zoning and land use regulations as violations of private property rights and believed imposition of such restrictions by federal agencies represented an overreach by governmental authority. Over the course of the 1970s, Goldwater and others would decry them as such.

On a more local level, other states noticed and were intrigued by SB 10. In 1972, for example, McCall received a request from Democratic Arkansas governor Dale Bumpers for information about land-use planning activities in Oregon, and McCall’s office replied with an outline not only of what had worked under SB 10 but also of the state’s proposed next steps. Bumpers was one among many state and local officials beginning to voice concerns about growth; the New York Times reported in 1971 that states ranging from Florida to California were becoming wary of population and urban expansion. Even traditionally pro-development organizations were growing alarmed. Director Dean McKellep, the former director of the San Jose, California, Chamber of Commerce, worried, “I look on this [San Jose] becoming a second Los Angeles . . . and if that isn’t doom, I don’t know what it is. We are victims of our own success.” McCall’s vision for Oregon as a testing ground for the rest of the country was apparent. He referred
to his environmental policy agenda as the “Oregon story,” informing a National Symposium on State Environmental Legislation in March 1972 that this “Oregon story is one which reflects a continued determination that while we serve man and his economic needs, we will also serve the needs of our natural resources.” McCall was eager to share Oregon’s story because “we may help other states and localities with ideas useful to them in furthering prudent natural resource management.”

**SB 10** opponents attempted to overturn the legislation via referendum in 1970, but both land-use reform and its most visible champion won the imprimatur of the Oregon electorate. Fifty-five percent of voters expressed support for **SB 10** and nearly 56 percent for Tom McCall, who campaigned on a platform urging additional planning legislation. Despite such victories, legislative opponents of comprehensive land-use planning continued to hold significant sway. Macpherson was elected to the state senate in 1970, and on taking office found no other legislators working on land use. He proposed a joint commission to study future policy development but was denied funds by Senate president John Burns, a conservative Portland Democrat. Macpherson went to McCall’s office for aid, finding his strongest ally in Bob Logan. Logan helped Macpherson find logistical support and federal funds to organize an informal Land Use Policy Committee to suggest improvements to **SB 10** under Macpherson’s direction.

Meanwhile, McCall’s administration joined forces with the Willamette Valley Environmental Protection and Planning Council, which had established a task force with similar aims called Project Foresight. The project commissioned a 1972 report by San Francisco landscape architect Lawrence Halprin titled “Willamette Valley: Choices for the Future.” In a nod to Progressive ideals of citizen involvement, the task force also traveled the state, meeting local citizens in 275 civic and town hall meetings and presenting contrasting scenarios of life with and without planning mechanisms in place. **McCall’s** fifth Conservation Congress, held in November 1972, focused on land-use planning and the recommendations of Project Foresight. The central issue, McCall told his assembled guests, was “whether we can morally justify forcing the next generation to pay the price of a failure of this generation to properly respect the land.” Warning that Oregon must not become a haven for “the buffalo-hunter mentality,” McCall advocated support for legislation then emerging from Macpherson’s committee. **SB 10** was a “good interim step,” but because county officials quite reasonably put local considerations first, the state needed to “take some heat off local officials” by establishing comprehensive planning procedures.

Comprehensive legislation garnered mixed support from farmers. Macpherson and other activist farmers represented a logical constituency for
Lawrence Halprin & Associates’ 1972 Willamette Valley: Choices for the Future examined two future scenarios for the area — one based on then-current development trends and another predicated on introduction of comprehensive land-use planning. This aerial photograph, included in the report, shows the types of growth extending from existing centers in the Willamette Valley.
land-use planning, and their interest in securing Oregon’s agricultural future was widely shared. Smaller farmers, generally represented by the Oregon Grange, tended to oppose planning, while commercial farmers organized under the auspices of the Oregon Farm Bureau were supportive. Concerns about the rapid development of prime farmland for non-agricultural uses joined with other factors — including the types of cultural conflicts Macpherson’s manure-spreading woes reflected and, more important, the rising property taxes farmers were facing — to generate support. Adjacent non-agricultural land tended to increase land prices overall, creating situations where high property taxes rendered agricultural use of the land financially infeasible. Opposition, however, could spring from similar grounds. Many small farmers who opposed planning legislation worried that their already marginal livelihoods would become even more compromised by an inability to sell their lands to developers.34

McCall and Macpherson enjoyed the company of some important business allies. New industries, such as the fledgling “Silicon Forest” of technology firms nesting in the Portland metro area’s Washington County at the time, appreciated the opportunities planning would afford for making informed decisions about factory placement. Even some of the more traditional players in the state’s economy appreciated McCall’s policies of conservation for use. John Gray, president of Omark Industries, a development firm and saw-chain manufacturer, argued that Oregon environmental regulations had promoted healthy growth, yielding increasing home-building permits and below-average unemployment rates. “If you attend your stewardship well,” Gray concluded, parroting McCall, “your care will be shown in the color of ink on your balance sheet, as well as in the color and shape of the land around us.” Many other developers, large timber firms, and the state’s two largest power companies, however, disagreed with Gray’s logic and opposed land-use legislation. McCall might rank as Associated Oregon Industries’ (AOI) “Livability Governor” for his administration’s “cooperation with business and industry, knowing that the health of one [sector of Oregon] is the success of the other[s],” but the organization did not support comprehensive land-use planning.35 Concerns about property rights, compensation in cases of restricted development opportunities, and preferences for local control exercised decisive sway. Intriguingly, however, AOI hedged its bets, combining opposition to statewide planning legislation with active involvement in composing a list of “critical areas” to be protected under Macpherson’s draft legislation.36 If history proved to be on Macpherson and McCall’s side, Oregon industry did not want to be left entirely in the cold.
With the hard work of preparation complete, McCall stepped to the rostrum in January 1973 and issued a challenge to the Oregon Legislature in predictably flamboyant prose. “There is a shameless threat to our environment and to the whole quality of life — unfettered despoiling of the land,” he warned the assembled legislators. “Sagebrush subdivisions, coastal ‘condomania,’ and the ravenous rampage of suburbia in the Willamette Valley all threaten to mock Oregon’s status as the environmental model for the Nation.” McCall was careful to cast the debate in statewide context. Just a few weeks prior, the commissioners of central Oregon’s Jefferson County had appealed to him for a moratorium on subdivisions, citing out-of-control speculation that was defeating local attempts at rational development. “The interests of Oregon for today and in the future must be protected from grasping wastrels of the land. We must respect another truism: That unlimited and unregulated growth leads inexorably to a lowered quality of life.”\(^37\) SB 100 proceeded quickly to the docket of the Senate Environment and Land Use Committee, where sponsors Macpherson and Sen. Ted Hallock, a Portland Democrat and chair of the committee, held sway. Macpherson and his fellow drafters emphasized that while the state land-use policies of Hawaii and Vermont, then the most stringent, enforced total state control, SB 100 would take a more localized approach. They urged that 90 percent of planning and zoning decisions be made at the local level, with state or federal input covering only those decisions concerning “critical areas and critical activities.”\(^38\)

As Macpherson later observed, local officials were closest to the grassroots — literally. Without local experts capable of judging soil types or other elements of the landscape, successful planning would not be possible. Here, Progressive ideals of “wise management” by experts who understood the landscape dovetailed neatly with contemporary Republican preferences for devolution of authority. The original bill called for fourteen regional planning districts. Cities and counties within each district would zone as they saw fit, with regional councils then establishing comprehensive plans setting growth policy for the districts. Local plans would be subordinate to district plans, and districts to the state. The bill would establish a state commission to set guidelines and objectives; that commission would have special authority in certain areas of either rapid growth or special scenic significance.\(^39\)

Public comment demonstrated the divergent opinions legislators faced in crafting a solution that could pass muster before the full Senate and House. Ironically, Macpherson’s attempts to devolve authority without diluting the strength of a comprehensive plan created trouble with traditional power brokers at more local levels. The League of Oregon Cities had already passed
Wilsonville mayor Philip Balsinger took a more measured approach in his committee testimony, agreeing $b\ 100$ was “overdue” but expressing a concern shared by many small town mayors that the regional council proposal could limit the voice of small cities in making planning decisions. Craig Markham of Sherwood, an environmental activist and Sierra Club spokesman, memorably described the sprawling Portland suburb of Beaverton as the “Sodom and Gomorrah” of land-use planning and lauded $b\ 100$’s potential to halt rural area “blockbusting” by land speculators. Gene Magee of the Oregon Coast Association argued that local governments could handle zoning and planning decisions better than a state “super agency,” but he also volunteered his time to help make $b\ 100$ more palatable. The need for compromise regarding the regional council and critical area provisions of the bill became increasingly clear. Regional councils threatened the autonomy of Oregon’s county
In reality, eleven regional councils already coordinated a variety of planning efforts throughout the state, but city and county officials and Oregon realtors vociferously opposed the notion of further entrusting planning authority to governing bodies beyond the local level. Even regional council supporters, such as the League of Women Voters, urged the Senate to adopt stronger guidelines governing citizen input into the development of plans and zoning regulations. Opposition to the critical area provisions was even broader and, under pressure from critics, initial participants such as aoi began arguing for “guidelines” rather than firm designations.\(^4\)

With \(\text{sb} \, 100\) in trouble, Hallock made a political masterstroke, appointing L.B. Day as chair of a subcommittee entrusted with revising the bill. Day was the outgoing Department of Environmental Quality spokesman, longtime Teamsters Union representative, and Republican convert. Day had represented agriculturally rich Marion County in the state House, and his Teamsters charges were the cannery workers of the Willamette Valley. As planning expert Sy Adler put it, “Day embodied a labor-farmer-environmental alliance” — he was the perfect individual to negotiate a compromise among competing interests.\(^5\) Day understood that the question of scale must be addressed; counties, localities, and citizens all needed to feel a sense of ownership. Deeply immersed in the state’s agricultural economy, Day also understood the necessity of land preservation and planned development for maintaining Oregon’s productive resources. He joined Macpherson in negotiating an amended bill that eliminated mandatory regional councils, thereby giving counties more power and funding, and replaced direct state control over critical areas with a requirement that the land-use committee “study” regions of “critical state concern” and then give “priority” consideration to certain types of areas. Day also ensured that agricultural land made it onto that “priority” list. While McCall was less than thrilled to see the regional council provision eliminated, he believed that “in most respects it is more satisfactory than the original \(\text{sb} \, 100\).”\(^4\)

Having passed the Senate by eighteen votes to ten, \(\text{sb} \, 100\) made its way to the House, where Hallock, Macpherson, and Day urged the Environment and Land Use Committee to avoid any major changes, warning that returning an altered bill to the Senate would give opponents the opportunity to doom the entire proposal. The committee succeeded in reporting an unchanged bill to the full House, and on May 25, \(\text{sb} \, 100\) passed with a recorded vote of forty to twenty. A delighted McCall signed the legislation into law on May 29.\(^4\)

McCall’s rhetoric during the public debate over \(\text{sb} \, 100\) illustrates how he perceived his environmental activism. Speaking at a February 8 dinner in honor of Day, McCall argued: “Caring about the environment doesn’t make anyone an environmentalist or a preservationist. It simply reaffirms governments.\(^4\)
a belief that people ought to be able to enjoy where they live, and that their visitors ought to be able to enjoy this land too, always.” While it is safe to assume from his wider activism that McCall would have been comfortable with the label “environmentalist,” he articulated a vision for Oregon’s future that went beyond clean air, clean water, and noise regulation to “protection and improvement of the whole quality of life.” Casting his administration’s environmental policy in populist terms, he argued that land-use planning and zoning “improve the value of land and enhance the quality of life. Adequate protections must be had against predacious ravagers of the land.”

In McCall’s “Oregon Story,” land-use planning was of and for the people. The revised SB 100 ensured that citizens would play a significant role in the development of land-use policy, both through widespread involvement in defining the provisions guiding implementation and in preservation of a local-government role for land-use planning. Citizen involvement remained a key to good government, just as it had during Oregon’s Progressive Era.

OREGON’S DEBATE over comprehensive land-use planning took place in the context of a similar debate on the national stage. Contrasting the two sheds light on the factors that made SB 100 successful while national legislation failed. Also in early 1973, U.S. Sen. Henry M. Jackson of neighboring Washington made a fourth attempt in as many years to address land-use planning with the Land Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act of 1973, or Senate Bill 268. Sounding very much like McCall, the Democrat warned that “the chaotic land use decision-making of today will insure an unsightly, unproductive and unrewarding land resource for future generations of Americans.”

Called to offer testimony before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, McCall argued that no single action could do more for environmental protection and enhancement than comprehensive land-use planning. A federal role was especially significant for western states; 53 percent of Oregon’s land, for example, was federally owned. McCall’s handwritten notes demonstrate more emphatically his sense of urgency: “Lord Almighty, you’re not dealing with the second coming — If this light-year process were telescoped into 8 day[s] — you’d still be too late — Any lee-way — Any future deadline — And the sellers will cry out to the exploiters — come and get it — It’s your last chance!”

A man who tended to over-identify with his causes, McCall reflected “I have no apologies, except that I wish I were a hale and hearty 100 + and had started fighting to save the virgin land much before 1938.”

Jackson’s S. 268 passed the Senate in June. It would have provided between 66 and 90 percent of the funds necessary for states to cover the administrative costs of land-use programs, while requiring that a number of planning
and regulatory measures be taken within three to five years. In the House, however, green pastures for land-use planning soon withered. The Nixon administration began to modify its initial support as early as September 1973. Nixon, appearing before Congress, proclaimed himself “pleased” the Senate had passed legislation “incorporating many of the policies I have proposed.” He indicated, however, that the Senate bill was deficient because it imposed “an excessive financial burden on the Federal Government.” By March 1974, proponents of land-use planning on the New York Times editorial board derided a House Rules Committee “coup” that had “buried” land-use planning legislation that House Interior Committee members had once “warmly supported.” The Times pinned responsibility for the switch on pressures applied to Congress and the increasingly besieged president by the Chamber of Commerce, the Liberty Lobby, the John Birch Society, “various special-interest business groups,” and the Brotherhood of Carpenters. Instead of supporting Jackson’s bill, Nixon now favored a “wholly meaningless” alternative bill proposed by Rep. Sam Steiger (r-AZ), a prominent anti-environmentalist who once noted of his sharkskin boots that “I wear nothing but endangered species.” Lamenting land-use proponents’ poor advocacy, the Times concluded that reversal of fortunes was “a perfect illustration of what happens when one side [writes members of Congress] and the other does not.”

This photo captures McCall’s visit with President Richard Nixon in 1970. The president’s purely political approach toward environmental policy rendered such concerns easy to jettison as the Watergate scandal placed his administration under increasing pressure.
In June 1974, the House killed Jackson’s legislation in a 211 to 204 procedural vote over whether the bill should be brought to the floor for consideration.33 Opponents contended the legislation would undermine states’ rights, threaten personal property rights, and “bring big government into everyone’s backyard.” Rep. John Camp (r-ok) proclaimed it the “first step toward getting control over private property — it would affect every property owner in the United States.”34 The New York Times environmental reporter, Gladwin Hill, contended the bill’s outcome, and Nixon’s reversal in particular, was “impeachment politics” meant to appease congressional conservatives.35 The newspaper’s editorial board cynically concluded:

The need for land-use control is obvious, that is to all except those whose vision is blurred by the outmoded illusion of America as an unlimited cornucopia, those who are willing to grasp for the fast real estate or development buck irrespective of the consequences, and those for whom the survival of the Nixon Administration takes first priority.36

Political scientist Margaret Weir concluded of S. 268 that it foundered on the shoals of competing bureaucratic interests. While pro-development, anti-government advocates such as Steiger and Camp successfully marshaled the opposition, potential allies greeted S. 268 with skepticism due to their instincts toward self-preservation. National bodies that might have been expected to support the bill sought instead to institutionalize power at levels of government where they could best exercise influence. Urban renewal interests, for example, preferred guaranteed federal subsidies to the decentralized, state-driven S. 268 agenda, while the national environmental lobby preferred increased federal regulation. Neither coterie of interests was eager to build a new arena of authority in the states where their power would be less certain.37

While S. 268 had a dedicated advocate in Jackson, it lacked a Day and a Macpherson to do the hard work of bringing various interests to heel. Political conservatives were becoming increasingly wary of government intervention in American life. Jackson’s bill placed planning firmly in the hands of state governments, but it nonetheless represented a federal assertion of preferred policy. McCall would have agreed with his conservationist forebear Gifford Pinchot that government “is the manager of society. It is the one agency which cannot shirk or pass on the blame for bad management.” Conservatives, however, increasingly viewed such notions as false and even dangerous, particularly as applied to natural resource planning.38 Jackson’s assurances of state control rang hollow to legislators such as Congressman Thomas Hagedorn (r-MN), elected in 1974 and eager to point out that so-called voluntary legislation in areas such as price control had led toward “the legislated disasters of shortened supply and unemployment.”39
McCall’s rhetoric in the wake of S. 268 offers a second insight into the two bills’ differing fates. The conservation non-profit Izaak Walton League of America gave McCall an award in July 1974, the last year of his second and final term as governor. McCall devoted his acceptance speech to highlighting his administration’s environmental accomplishments. Turning to land-use planning, McCall bemoaned the failure of the recent “milquetoast” national legislation: “It’s unfair to deny to future generations any options on what they will do with the land left to them. I think we ought to leave them a few pieces over which they will have a discussion, because they are a lot more likely to use it better than we would.” McCall’s words illustrate the continuing centrality of use, of production, to his vision. What would future generations do? How would they use the land bequeathed to them? Comprehensive land-use policy would allow Americans to “minimize economic and social disparities between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas”; it could “show the way toward meeting social and economic needs while preserving natural environments”; it could “divert development away from fragile, publicly important, or overloaded environments toward areas where development is desired [emphasis added].”? Growth was a fact of life, but wise growth was essential for economic, environmental, and social reasons: “We need to use more of our land and resources — with wisdom — to help the needy rise out of poverty.” McCall’s planning ethic was concrete, specific, moral, and based on the principle of enlightened use. Roosevelt and Pinchot would have found his logic familiar.

By contrast, federal land-use planning legislation could — and did — quickly become abstract. SB 100 proponents were successful in crafting a dialogue about real people, in real conditions, experiencing real effects. This was the Oregon Story, a story of a specific place. While Jackson shared McCall’s concrete vision, the Nixon administration viewed land-use planning as a bargaining chip. Comprehensive planning was an abstract ideal, alienated from specific links to a particular landscape. Indeed, most state and local planning efforts that did succeed in the 1970s were specific and discrete. McCall believed in the Oregon Story as a prophetic vision, but the very size and diversity of the United States made his notion difficult to translate to a national audience.

Finally, as historians have detailed, expressions of environmentalism that focused on predominantly consumerist concerns faltered in concert with the faltering American economy during the 1970s. As energy prices rose and manufacturing jobs began to decline, notions of higher gas mileage requirements, more efficient emissions controls, or other natural resource protections that might curtail American industry became increasingly unpalatable, particularly when expressed in terms of comfort rather than as
potential spurs for new types of economic growth. Jobs were more important than reduced smog, and long-term investments in manufacturing innovation paled in importance compared to the immediate stresses of inflation and unemployment. By 1975, Nixon’s ambivalent stance on land-use planning was replaced with President Gerald Ford’s unambiguous opposition. Opinion was not wholly unanimous within the Ford administration. Interior Secretary Rogers C.B. Morton, for example, urged the president to support federal land-use planning legislation, but Ford believed such a bill would be too costly in light of a projected $60 billion federal budget deficit.  

While federal land-use planning efforts stumbled toward defeat, Oregon officials needed to implement the state’s landmark legislation. Despite McCall’s attempts to cast sb 100 in statewide terms, regional distinctions were readily visible. In the House, for example, forty-nine of sixty legislators representing Willamette Valley districts voted for sb 100; just nine of thirty legislators from coastal and eastern counties favored the bill’s passage. Support for sb 100 was far stronger among Democrats than Republicans, although a majority of gop representatives in both houses supported the legislation.

sb 100’s passage set into motion development of a citizen-led Land Conservation and Development Commission (lcdc), first chaired by L.B. Day, and a Department of Land Conservation and Development (dlcd) that would implement the lcdc’s planning strategies. In accordance with Progressive ideals, the dlcd and lcdc undertook Herculean efforts to ensure citizen participation in developing the state’s first fourteen land-use planning goals, which were announced in December 1974 following an extensive statewide calendar of town-hall meetings. Much of the commission’s work centered on creating urban-growth boundaries for cities and towns; outside urban centers, the lcdc created agricultural and forest-use zones to protect land for natural resource use. The lcdc’s composition reflects regional considerations; currently, for example, its seven members are drawn from each of Oregon’s five congressional districts, with two at-large positions. At least one representative, but no more than two, must be from Multnomah County, the state’s most populous and urban county.

Meanwhile, an organization that would become central to the lcdc’s success took shape under the direction of Allen Bateman, a Klamath County rancher (and California transplant), and public-interest lawyer Henry Richmond, who originally hailed from the Washington farming community of Walla Walla. The two men traveled throughout Oregon in 1974, organizing 1000 Friends of Oregon, the only single-purpose public-interest law firm in the United States. Still in existence today, 1000 Friends directs the entirety of its efforts to monitoring, advocating for, and initiating legal actions on
behalf of enforcing land-use planning. In other words, the organization is composed of experts striving to ensure efficient utilization of Oregon’s resources. McCall joined the organization’s board of directors in 1975. Macpherson, who was voted out of office in 1974, also joined the advisory board of 1000 Friends. 68

1000 Friends emerged from a mix of environmental groups and good-governance advocacy organizations, but Richmond did not envision it as an “environmental” group per se. “Land Use should be emphasized because everyone likes good land use, and not everyone thinks ‘environmental’ organizations are keen,” he explained to McCall in a memo urging his participation. “It should be stressed that a citizens’ organization with a core of professionals can be more responsible and less shrill because it will be
proposing and not simply opposing.” 1000 Friends’ reluctance to cast itself as an “environmental” organization was more than window dressing. From the start, the organization advocated for farmland preservation as a key component of the state’s economic policy — preservation, in other words, for use. It urged compact urban development as a way to reduce the cost of building infrastructure. The failure of federal land-use planning — and the resulting absence of dollars such legislation would have brought — made 1000 Friends even more important.

SB 100 and the organizations that supported it enjoyed substantial success. Between 1974 and 2007, less than 5 percent of extant farmland in the Willamette Valley was lost to development. Related reduced-farm-value tax assessment and right-to-farm protections gave farmers the confidence neces-

Images of farmland and new housing developments are punctuated by the phrase “Going . . . Going . . . Gone?”
sary to make long-term capital investments. While timber interests initially opposed the legislation, larger firms in particular have since recognized the benefits of forecasting and of preserving buffers between forest and residential areas. Small timber harvesters, however, often feel squeezed out of competition for scarce resources. Home builders have enjoyed legal certainty that allows for future planning and protection from “not in my backyard” interests. Both SB 100’s strengths and its drawbacks echo Progressive Era priorities. As historian Samuel Hays explained in his study of Progressive Era conservation, it was larger corporations that “could more readily afford to undertake conservation practices . . . [and] provide the efficiency, stability of operations, and long-range planning inherent in the conservation idea.”

So, too, Oregon enterprises with sufficient scale to maximize the benefits inherent in comprehensive planning have benefited most from SB 100.

Land-use planning survived ballot measure initiatives aimed at overturning the legislation in 1976, 1978, and 1982. Over the past thirty years, however, a significant property-rights activist community has emerged, led by the organization Oregonians in Action. Oregonians in Action opposes the notion that the LCDC and DLCD best represent citizen interests, contending instead that individuals should retain unfettered control over their property. If McCall and later supporters represent Progressivism’s legacy of encouraging citizen representation within a framework encouraging expertise and comprehensive planning, Oregonians in Action carries the standard for those who advocate a more broadly populist, anti-governmental position — private property rights have primacy, full stop. The campaign’s first successful challenge to SB 100 came in 2000 with the passage of Ballot Measure 7, which would have amended the state constitution to require state and local government to compensate owners if property values were lowered by land use regulations. The Oregon Supreme Court overturned the measure in 2002 on procedural grounds. Oregonians in Action’s second draft, Ballot Measure 37, was approved by 61 percent of Oregon voters in 2004 and allowed state and local governments to waive land-use regulations in lieu of compensating owners for their claims, opening the door to new waves of development. Planning advocates successfully retaliated in 2007 with Ballot Measure 49, which retained Measure 37’s compensate-or-waive principle if regulations had been imposed after the owner purchased a given property, but drastically limited the scale of new development allowed.

Reflecting on the first twenty years of comprehensive land-use planning in 1993, Richmond continued to emphasize that, while often misunderstood, the system inaugurated by SB 100 was not an “environmental” program. “I think the thing we can do,” he urged, “is to recast the program, in the mind of the public, to something that relates to basic economic values — not just
on the income-generation side (forestry and agriculture) but on the cost side.” Development outside the urban growth boundary in central Oregon’s Deschutes County, for example, created a need for infrastructure, impacted water tables, and heightened fire risk for new residents — all economic costs to cities, the county, and the state. More recently, questions of scale have continued to animate the discussion surrounding Oregon land-use planning. In early 2014, the Oregon Court of Appeals took the unusual step of voiding a contentious fifty-year growth plan developed by Metro, a government entity coordinating the actions of Portland-area Clackamas, Multnomah, and Washington counties. Each county commission had signed off on Metro’s plan, as had the LCDC, but the court found that Washington County had used “pseudo factors” to determine its rural reserves. The Oregon State Legislature crafted a compromise among developers, conservationists, and local governments that Gov. John Kitzhaber signed into law, but Democrats and Republicans alike cited a need to reform the system. Meanwhile, this exercise of state-level power over what had been a county-level decision-making process challenged the subsidiary impulse that initially drove SB 100.

As the history of SB 100 demonstrates, McCall’s vision of conservation-for-use in Oregon was and is a contested one. Consequences ranging from restrictions on property owners’ rights to high urban housing prices generate ongoing controversy over the merits and drawbacks of comprehensive land-use planning. Events including the 2014 “grand bargain” in the Oregon Legislature have generated momentum for reform on both sides of the aisle. Meanwhile, conservatives hostile toward Jackson’s bill in the early 1970s have exerted predominant control over the Republican Party since 1980, successfully casting environmental legislation as “liberal statism in action.”

Ronald Reagan’s election marked the ascendancy of a countervailing ideology for the Republican Party, one based not on an “age of limits” but on an optimistic vision of an unfettered future. Experts might promote plans, but freedom from government interference would allow the free market to solve American problems at home and abroad. Even in the realm of environmental policy, “free-market environmentalists” argued that in a world governed by self-interest, government bureaucrats strive to maximize their agencies’ budgets rather than the public good. In representing their own interests, at least private property owners internalize the costs and benefits of their decisions, conceivably behaving in ways that minimize personal and thus community harm. The party of Pinchot and of Roosevelt no longer offers ideological space for a Train, a Macpherson, or a McCall.

The effects of McCall and Macpherson’s efforts remain clear in the belts of farmland and forest that separate small Willamette Valley towns such as Newberg or Canby from the Portland metropolitan area and in the relatively
abrupt demarcations between development and countryside so visible from the air. Oregon continues to be logged; it continues to be farmed. Debates continue to proliferate over vehicular access to wilderness areas and channeling of hydro and wind power to generate electricity in areas notable for scenic beauty or fish habitat. McCall’s Progressive vision of conservation for use has often been replaced by more fractious struggles. The justice or injustice of such strategies is a matter for policy experts to debate; the events of the past several years indicate, however, that the Progressive Era ideals of McCall’s activism in the early 1970s no longer hold sway in the nation’s political imagination.

NOTES

1. Tom McCall, Maverick (Portland: Binford and Mort, 1977), 190; Richard D. Lamm, “Urban Growing Pains: Is Bigger Also Better?” The New Republic 164:23 (June 5, 1971): 17. Note McCall’s recollection of the journals’ titles differs from Lamm’s report, which notes only the first two titles. The Orbis Cascade Alliance library catalog provides full names for all three, so Lamm’s wording has been reproduced here with the addition of the formal title of Oregon Progress, Orbis Cascade Alliance, Summit Catalog, http://summit.worldcat.org/search?q=su%3AOregon+Economic+policy+Periodicals.&qt=hot_subject, (accessed November 12, 2014).


10. Brian Allen Drake, Loving Nature,

22. Walth, Fire at Eden’s Gate, 352.


30. Walker and Hurley, Planning Paradise, 48. Intriguingly, Burns’s opposition to Macpherson’s activities, and later to reporting SB 100 out of committee in 1973, was founded on his belief that the Linn County farmer’s planning goals were too weak. Walker and Hurley, Planning Paradise 63.


34. Walker and Hurley, Planning Paradise, 50–51.


40. Robbins, Landscapes of Conflict, 291.


43. Adler, Oregon Plans, 56, 60–64.

44. Ibid., 65.

45. Ibid., 66–68. Counties retained the right to affiliate in regional governments, should they choose to do so.


47. Transcript, remarks by McCall at dinner for L. B. Day, February 8, 1873, box 22, folder “Meetings, Speeches, February 1973,” McCall Papers, OHS Research Library.


49. Undated, handwritten notes in Tom McCall’s hand, box 22, folder “Statement to Senate Com. on Interior and Insular Affairs re S. 268 2/7/1973,” McCall Papers, OHS Research Library.

50. New York Times, September 3, 1973, p. 4; Jayne E. Daly, “A Glimpse of the Past—A Vision for the Future: Senator Henry M. Jackson and National Land Use Regulation,” Federal Published Article, EPA, http://landuse.law.pace.edu/landuse/documents/PublishedArticle/SenatorJackson.doc (accessed November 12, 2014). Within three years of enactment, states would be required to set up land-use agencies with power to formulate land-use programs; inventory states’ land, resources, and populations; and develop plans to regulate land sales and large suburban or exurban housing developments. Within five years, states would be required to control the use of environmentally sensitive areas, control land subject to developmental impact from large facilities such as airports, control large-scale developments with regional impact, influence the location of new communities, maintain all developments in keeping with antipollution laws, and assure citizen participation in planning measures.


53. House sponsor Morris Udall (D-AZ) would make another, failed attempt to bring the legislation before the House in 1975.


61. An August 1975 New York Times report, for example, detailed bills for land regulation adopted by 17 states that focused predominantly on specific concerns: North Dakota and Wyoming, for example, asserted authority over the siting of power plants, while Maryland, New Jersey, and Texas passed legislation regarding shoreline and off-shore development. New York enacted state controls on wetlands, while Florida, North Dakota, Iowa, and Wyoming established controls on surface mining. Several states passed laws requiring local or regional land-use planning. Perhaps most notable as expressions of continuing potential for broader state-level planning were bills enacted in Florida, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Virginia stating that if localities did not act on land-use planning, the state government could step in. Gladwin Hill, New York Times, August 19, 1975, 17.


63. New York Times, April 24, 1975, 9. Ironically, over time even conservative pro-growth advocates such as Steiger sometimes changed their tune. Late in life, Steiger served as mayor of Prescott, Arizona, campaigning against the unplanned growth that was making his city a model of Sunbelt sprawl. Daughter Gail Steiger reported on his death in 2012: “By the time he was in his 70s, he was kind of shaking his head at all that [opposition to planning]. He said that if he had that to do over again, he’d have rethought it.” New York Times, October 6, 2012, B8.


66. Walker and Hurley, Planning Paradise, 68; Robbins, Landscapes of Conflict, 292. The first fourteen goals were: 1) citizen involvement; 2) land use planning; 3) agricultural land; 4) forest lands; 5) open spaces, scenic and historic areas, and natural resources; 6) air, water, and land resources quality; 7) areas subject to natural disaster and hazards; 8) recreational needs; 9) economy of the state; 10) housing; 11) public facilities and services; 12) transportation; 13) energy conservation; and 14) urbanization. A fifteenth goal, the Willamette River Greenway, was added in December 1975; the following year saw the addition of four more goals focusing on coastal issues: 16) estuarine resources; 17) coastal shorelands; 18) beaches and dunes; and 19) ocean resources. “Introduction,” Abbott, et. al., xiv–xv.


68. Walker and Hurley, Planning Paradise, 69; Adler, Oregon Plans, 159.


71. Hays, Conservation, 263.

72. Walker and Hurley, Planning Paradise, 9–10: 95–6. Hector Macpherson’s son Greg helped draft Measure 49 while serving as a Democratic state representative and chair of the House Judiciary Committee. He also served on the LDC.


75. Drake, Loving Nature, Fearing the State, 182.

76. Ibid., 117, 120.