The War to End War
One Hundred Years Later

A First World War Roundtable

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THE CONFLICT that H.G. Wells and other contemporaries depicted as the “war to end war,” which we now know as the First World War, was a horrific global conflict that brought many complex questions and significant changes to Oregon and the nation. The United States entered the war in April 1917. The United States’ wartime aim, according to President Woodrow Wilson, was nothing less than “making the world safe for democracy,” which dovetailed nicely with major patterns of the Progressive Era, an intense period of transformation, reform, and reaction from the 1890s through 1920. From the outbreak of the conflict in Europe in the summer of 1914 through the peace-making in Paris in late 1918 and early 1919, Americans from all walks of life engaged in myriad strands of wartime activism that related directly to questions of citizenship.

The essays that follow provide vital discussions of that action for Oregon and for the nation. These intertwined historical analyses explore what we might call the “long” First World War period from the 1910s into the 1930s; they tackle distinctly Oregon perspectives as well as historical developments seen from national and global positions. Together, this roundtable reveals that one hundred years after the official U.S. entry into the war, we are still gleaning fresh insights, asking innovative questions, and finding new sources to better understand the significance and impact of the First World War in Oregon, in the United States, and for the world.

Before the war, many Oregonians were active participants in Progressive Era movements for reform. They built the Oregon System to bring government closer to the people, to fight corporate interests, and to empower com-
ommunities through the initiative, referendum, and recall processes; enacted woman suffrage in 1912; and took steps to create safer workplaces and to support workers through maximum-hour legislation and the first enforceable minimum wage. Some Oregonians embraced more radical calls for change by supporting the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), embracing Socialism, and participating in increasingly fierce labor disputes from 1913 through the U.S. entry into the war and during its aftermath.¹ During the conflict, military and civilian officials so feared labor radicalism in the vital lumber industry, necessary for the construction of ships and airplanes, that they militarized workers as the Spruce Production Division and created an alternative labor organization, the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen.²

After the global conflict began in 1914, participants in movements for reform and peace vied with those engaged in movements for military preparedness, and those tensions sliced through the reform and progressive communities. Tension also resulted from wartime calls for loyalty to the goals of an expanding nationalist state, backed up by the repressive Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918 that criminalized free speech and dissent. Official and local campaigns to silence opposition included brutal community surveillance of dissenters at the national level and in Oregon. Like other Americans, Oregonians had many responses to the question of whether to support or oppose the conflict, with varying concepts of citizenship rooted in their decisions.

One of Oregon’s two progressive Democratic U.S. Senators, Harry Lane, M.D., joined five other colleagues to oppose Wilson’s war message to Congress in April 1917. Vilified in the local and national press and in the midst of a worsening health crisis, Lane died on his way home to Oregon to recuperate in May 1917.³ Portlanders Louise Bryant and Jack Reed observed and chronicled the early days of the Russian Revolution with great hope for the potential it held for world peace; he in Ten Days that Shook the World (1919) and she in Six Red Months in Russia (1919).⁴ Oregon National Woman’s Party members Clara Wold and sisters Betty and Alice Gram picketed the White House to protest Wilson’s opposition to a Constitutional Amendment supporting woman suffrage. All three were jailed for their actions.⁵ Socialist Finns in Astoria who opposed the conflict engaged in anti-war activities while facing a double scrutiny as immigrants and political radicals.⁶ A wide range of Oregonians engaged in various acts of daily resistance to the new imperatives of loyalty.⁷

Other Oregonians supported U.S. entry into the conflict because of their concepts of citizenship and civic identity. George Earle Chamberlain, Oregon’s second progressive Democratic U.S. Senator, served on the Senate Military Affairs Committee. He helped create the Selective Service Act, supported military preparedness, and worked to improve the equipping of troops and expand protections for soldiers in military justice courts.⁸ Members of Portland’s Black community supported fifty-eight Black soldiers from Oregon departing for service at Camp Lewis, Washington, in August 1918 with a parade and public ceremony. They insisted on the significance of that service for Black citizenship.⁹ Male doctors and women nurses and other staff members served with the U.S. Army Medical Corps Base Hospital 46 in Bazoilles-sur-Meuse, France.¹⁰ Portland’s Reed College had the distinction of conducting the largest program for the training of female Reconstruction Aides, as occupational and physical therapists were then

MEMBERS OF AN AFRICAN AMERICAN Army unit nicknamed the “Portland Bunch” belonged to Company 21, 116th Depot Brigade. Some of the unit members are pictured here at Camp Lewis, Washington, on August 23, 1918.
called, for home-front and warfront service." Personal and professional identities influenced the civic meaning of participants’ wartime service.

After the November 11, 1918, Armistice that concluded the conflict, Oregon State Librarian Cornelia Marvin accepted the monumental task of working for the state’s Council of National Defense. In company with city and county volunteers, schoolteachers, and veterans and their families, Marvin gathered some 36,000 personal histories of home and warfront service. Marvin’s research combined with state records indicates that 34,430 men from Oregon served in the army, navy, and marines during the conflict; 6 percent were wounded or died from injury or disease. Some of those deaths were caused by the global influenza pandemic that began in 1918. They included Enid McKern, who died serving in the U.S. Student Nurse Corps at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Baker, Oregon, while treating influenza patients. Almost 50,000 people on the Oregon homefront contracted the disease from 1918 to 1920, and 3,875 died — a harrowing coda to the conflict.

Some Oregon women adopted a transnational perspective in their activist work during the war’s aftermath. They emphasized a civic identity above and beyond the nation as a hallmark of women’s more complete citizenship. Esther Lovejoy expanded her wartime work for the Red Cross and her associations with women doctors from various nations as co-founder of the Medical Women’s International Association in 1919. She then directed a medical humanitarian organization, the American Women’s Hospitals, for the next fifty years, providing medical relief to some twenty-three nations. Following her work directing the African American branch of the Portland Young Women’s Christian Association (YMCA) in the early 1920s, Mabel Byrd worked for the League of Nations Bureau of International Labor and spoke at the Sixth Congress of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) in Prague in 1929 on “Racial Conflict Within Countries.” Ava Milam, the Oregon State College home economist who educated Oregonians on food conservation during the war, helped to establish domestic science programs for women in Chinese colleges, and developed international student exchanges at Oregon State College (now Oregon State University) to foster transnational understanding on both sides of the Pacific.

For many Americans, including many Oregonians, the aftermath of war brought new civic concerns. Many residents feared that returning veterans would become radicalized in the climate of labor unrest and unemployment following the conflict, or that wartime violence would shadow their homecomings. For many, the solution lay in heterosexual marriage and making men breadwinners in a new culture of consumerism after the constraints of war. Oregon legislators joined like-minded lawmakers in other states and, in January 1919, passed legislation creating a Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Commission with $100,000 to provide assistance and employment for veterans, especially those who married and had families to support. Fears of radicalism also brought resistance to the demands of unions and strikers in 1919, and the Pacific Northwest saw coalitions among government, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), and some citizens to challenge workers of color and members of the IWW.

**THE WAR YEARS** helped to generate migration into the Pacific Northwest, new shipbuilding operations, expanded timbering, and more. These changes were part of the nation’s wartime transformation that is breathtaking in historical perspective.

“America has a real capital at last,” opined journalist Harrison Rhodes in March 1918, in the midst of the U.S. war effort. As Christopher Capozzola has argued, Washington, D.C., was transformed by the war experience. The city grew by almost 50 percent in population. The influx of new people meant new buildings and make-shift huts for living and for working sprang up virtually everywhere. These people served the enlarged government needs for administration of the wartime economy, including price controls (setting prices and priorities, standardizing war production); financing the war (selling Liberty Bonds), mobilizing men, women, and material; generating pro-war propaganda (muckraker George Creel led the Committee on Public Information); and responding to the call for new surveillance and oversight (the Federal Bureau of Investigation grew out of Justice Department’s Bureau of Investigation). This remaking of the nation’s capital in Washington, D.C., is best understood as a microcosm for developments across the nation. Indeed, as the essays in this issue show in various ways, the experience of the First World War helped culminate the era in which the United States became “modern.”

Urbanization and industrialization dramatically reshaped the landscape of the nation — intellectually, economically, culturally, ethno-racially, and environmentally. Reform initiatives and new political insurgencies, from the Socialists to the Populists to the Progressives and more, had recently realigned American politics. But it was the war experience that finally precipitated a modern state in the United States. National participation in
the conflict gave rise to new claims to citizenship alongside new forms of rejecting the state and of formulating dissent. Involvement in the war was built on the foundations of industrialization, modernization, urbanization, and a host of developments that undergirded wartime production. The United States’ involvement in the war, even before formally declaring war in 1917, also helped generate national and international movements that deployed innovative techniques intended to mobilize nations and peoples toward international peace or to create new transnational networks that defied the seemingly problematic ties of bellicose nation states.

The war had been a global phenomenon. Although in the hindsight of the Second World War, the First World War may seem less “global,” its ramifications were felt across the planet. Four empires fell between 1914 and 1920 — Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire. The United States seemed ascendant. At the time it was fought, what rapidly came to be called the “Great War” was widely understood not just as a world war but also as an epochal moment in world history. It was the first “total war,” in which entire nations, industrial plants, and peoples could be organized toward the waging of war. The peacemaking, too, generated a global flood of new thinking, which historian Erez Manela aptly termed the “Wilson moment.” Anti-colonial nationalism developed and deepened. A new generation of leaders — Jawaharlal Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi, Syngman Rhee, Ho Chi Minh, and Mao Zedong, among others — came to the forefront as quasi-Wilsonians. They adapted and pushed for their own distinct visions of “self-determination” in still-colonized areas such as Korea, China, India, Egypt, Vietnam, and elsewhere. During 1918 and into 1919, the United States appeared to be a force for global good through the Wilsonian rhetoric of rejecting Old World politics and empire on the terms of making the world “safe for democracy” through a “peace without victory,” and through the apparent American support for “self-determination” as evidenced in Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points (issued in January 1918). These, however, fell by the wayside in peace negotiations at Paris, where the major powers sought a more vindictive peace; less-powerful peoples and nations achieved far less than had seemed possible when the Armistice was signed on November 11, 1918.

Anti-colonial nationalists around the world quickly became disillusioned with American leadership and democracy, due to the United States’ support for colonialism at the Paris Peace Conference. American diplomats, under the leadership of Wilson, sought to safeguard the League of Nations concept as they paid only lip service to notions of self-determination and irredentism (movements to reclaim or establish sovereignty in areas based on real and perceived historic ethno-national ties). A global backlash against the United States and the West resulted.

At home, the war left a bloody aftermath. The year 1919 was marked by the most widespread strikes in U.S. history, headlined by the Seattle General Strike, the Boston police strike, and the Great Steel Strike. There were more than twenty major race riots across the nation — from the capitol to Chicago, Illinois; Omaha, Nebraska; Charleston, South Carolina; and beyond — leaving hundreds dead, thousands homeless, and tremendous damage to property. That year was also notable for the Red Scare, the “Palmer raids” enacted by the U.S. Department of Justice under the leadership of Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, and an ensuing set of mass deportations of so-called “alien radicals.”

During the period of U.S. formal neutrality (1914 to 1917), Americans were still active in attempts to mediate the conflict at the national and international levels. There was, of course, Henry Ford’s famous “peace ship” push in 1915. Partly at the behest of U.S. and international peace activists, Ford chartered the liner Oscar II and filled it with some of the foremost peace and reform activists, along with journalists and intellectuals, and went on a peace campaign mission to Europe (without approval or endorsement from the U.S. government). While the trip was widely ridiculed and unsuccessful, it was nevertheless a high-profile manifestation of a broad and deep U.S. antiwar sentiment that did have major impacts during and after the war. Most notable was the collaboration between Chicago settlement house pioneer and activist Jane Addams and Boston professor and settlement house activist Emily Balch, as co-founders of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). They became the first two American women to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, for their antiwar work from the First World War through the 1930s (Addams in 1931 and Balch in 1946). Like Oregonians including Lovejoy, Byrd, and Milam, many U.S. women engaged in a new sort of transnational activism generated by the war and postwar years.

Much of the U.S. liberal intellectual response to the war and then to the post-war world revolved around debates that had begun in earnest during the war; these involved fundamental questions about the nature, stability, and justness of democracy as well as the proper role of citizens and intellectuals in democratic education. Made all the more urgent in the wartime context of sorting out enemies and allies, American political culture became dominated by hyper-patriotic activities and by anti-war
activists rejecting simplistic us-and-them binaries. As these essays reveal, in Oregon as across the nation, heated wartime debates over patriotism and identity also prompted discussion of the varied “fitness” of citizens and immigrants. As in past wars, most notably during the Civil War, willingness to sacrifice was paramount — be it through military service (voluntary or forced via the draft), buying war bonds, or other methods — in wartime America. These were not tolerant years.

New articulations of older racist arguments for who could identify as American emerged under the term “Americanism” (also known as “100% Americanism”), and these notions informed emerging hyper-patriotic vigilante groups. But such visions did not develop or stand alone. Hyper-patriotic Americanism arose in part in response to new immigration, fairly rampant antiwar thought, and competing new ideas about cultural pluralism and the benefits of being an “immigrant nation.” These ideas — often espoused by Socialist leader Eugene Debs, who was jailed for speaking out against the draft — were premised on free speech and democratic ideals. Antiwar activists were fairly heterodox; however, in dissenting against the war, they tended to reject assimilationist views of the melting pot in favor of populist views of politics and, at the intellectual level, of an embrace of what came to be known as positive “cultural gifts” (a precursor to multiculturalism).25

The first pitched battles about what the United States owed to the world came in part during Senate debates over ratifying the Treaty of Versailles and joining the League of Nations, which eventually concluded with Senate rejection of the treaty and the league. In turn, inward-turning nationalism, a variant of ferocious wartime “Americanism,” became dominant after the war. But this was no walled-and-bounded isolationism. American diplomats, business leaders, intellectuals, artists, and activists were thoroughly enmeshed in international commerce and culture, yet in terms of foreign relations and formal diplomacy, U.S. policies tended to prioritize avoiding binding alliances and organizations along with multilateral guarantees, which scholar George Herring aptly characterized as “involvement without commitment.”26

U.S. responses to both external crises and internal pressures throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s make plain both this pattern of involvement without commitment and a priority on U.S. interests. These oscillations of being involved with the world yet unilaterally so were headlined by the U.S. campaign for naval disarmament (in 1920 and 1921), American support for debt reconstruction in Europe (through the Dawes and Young plans, for example), and U.S. leadership in the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war (1928). Yet the tension was also evident in the harshest immigration restriction acts in U.S. history (1921, 1924), passed in a climate of rising Ku Klux Klan influence, xenophobia, race hatred, and segregation. In addition, this inward and exclusionist orientation had an economic face: it gave rise to a series of protectionist policies, such as the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff (1930). Insights from the First World War and its aftermath, namely efforts to “learn the lessons” of a war that most Americans by the mid 1930s believed had not been in the national interest, shaped how citizens and politicians confronted the cataclysmic events that followed, such as the
Great Depression and the territorial and diplomatic aggression by Germany, Italy, and Japan, which began fracturing the world system.27

THE AUTHORS of the essays that follow present us with thoughtful case studies examining identity and citizenship during the First World War and its aftermath in Oregon and the nation. Michael Kazin studies the diverse Americans opposed to the world war who formed, in his estimation, the “most sophisticated peace coalition” in the nation’s history to that point. They came from many ethnic, racial, and regional backgrounds, political parties, and economic classes. They held varied opinions on questions such as woman suffrage and White privilege. But their shared identity as citizens resulted from their commitment to end war. Members of this anti-war coalition also united in their opposition to the set of new civic obligations presented by the growing state bureaucracy that waged war against rulers abroad and against dissenters and their civil liberties at home.

At the state level, Michael Helquist’s work analyzes key details about the ninety-nine Oregonians who were arrested for dissent on the home front as reported in the Oregonian newspaper. They were diverse in their opposition, but their shared identity as “anti-citizens” was imposed on them by neighbors and other “vigilance-minded” community members during the conflict. And Steven Beda emphasizes that White, male, skilled workers used the new powers of the wartime state, including the War Labor Board, to build their capacity to bargain for their own labor interests, particularly in the shipbuilding and logging industries of Oregon and Washington. They did so at the expense of unskilled workers of color and those born outside the United States. Postwar violence against strikers and members of the IWW and the postwar empowerment of the Oregon KKK were part of “tacit state approval of vigilantism” aligning the state, White skilled workers, and White supremacists and linking Whiteness and economic citizenship in the postwar state.

The African American activists and writers in this same postwar period studied by Adriane Lentz-Smith challenged White supremacists’ negative depictions of Black soldiers with a “Black countermemory”; they linked wartime service with “empowered citizenship” and an end to Jim Crow segregation. For writers such as Addie Waites Hunton, Kathryn Johnson, W.E.B. Du Bois, and W.A. Sweeney, insisting on publicizing the accomplishments of African Americans during the conflict became a way to inscribe the civic meaning of Black Americans’ war service in the ongoing struggle for civil rights. Steven Sabol’s study reveals that many members of American Indian tribal communities supported the war by serving in the military and engaging in homefront activities such as Liberty Loan purchases to contribute their civic “share” as part of claims to reciprocal rights and belonging in the United States. For them, the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act was a welcome postwar advance in democracy. Members of other Indian nations opposed U.S. citizenship, worried that it “might easily consume distinctive indigenous sovereignty” and culture. And as Candice Bredbenner demonstrates, American women peace activists in the interwar years created a coalition to end war and a shared identity as women citizens by emphasizing two narratives about the First World War. First, they charged that wars came about by “the tragic excesses of governments unconstrained by the wills and interests of their people.” Second, they linked the achievement of votes for women with a new internationalism and the civic obligation to keep the nation safe from another conflict.

DESPITE ITS SIGNIFICANCE, there is relatively modest knowledge or memory of the First World War in the United States. In part, this makes sense. Compared to other nations and peoples involved in the war, the United States was at a distance from the fighting. It came late to the war, and its people suffered far less than other belligerents (53,000 combat and 116,000 total military deaths, and 204,000 military casualties, as compared to, for example, France’s 1.15 million combat deaths, almost 1.4 million total military deaths, and 4.26 million military casualties). Americans also tend to be confused conceptually by the two world wars. As teachers of history know, younger Americans, at least, have a hard time discerning between World War II nomenclature of “Axis” (German, Japan, Italy) versus “Allies” (United States, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, et al) and frequently import that better-known adversarial world war language of alliance back to the First World War, instead of the historically correct “Triple Entente” (France, United Kingdom, Russia, and later, others) and “Central Powers” or “Triple Alliance” (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, plus the Ottoman Empire).

This slippage is more than mere ignorance or a simple mistake. It represents a substantial lacuna in historical memory and understanding about what made the First World War unique and transformative, as we will see in the essays that follow. Why such slippage? One speculation of many scholars is that in Western historical memory, particularly in the United States, the Second World War spectacularly overshadows the First World War. So far as there is a shared view by Americans of the war it is of
the Western Front and the horrors of trench warfare, chemical weapons, and outdated military tactics resulting in massive loss of life. This picture erroneously dominates popular memory.

As historians now tend to emphasize, there is more to the conflict and the war years. In many countries, unlike the United States, the First World War is far from the only or most defining event of its era. Take for example the Easter Rising of Irish nationalists in Dublin, Ireland, in 1916, the Armenian genocide that spanned the 1915 to 1923 period, the 1919 Amritsar massacre in the Punjab, India, and the February and October Revolutions in 1917 in Russia — each of which exemplifies how the war created conditions around the world that made such events possible and, in turn, how those events deeply inflect war memory.

It used to be that the history of both world wars tended to be premised on national historical perspectives, but new trends that emphasize the international and transnational as part of global history provide us with insights that transform perceptions and interpretations of the First World War. New work on the League of Nations by Susan Pedersen, for example, provides new vistas onto global historical developments by focusing on the rise of new international organizations, institutions, and networks of experts and ideas, peoples, and groups out of the war. With the League of Nations at the center, she argues, these new international-institutional configurations helped construct the edifice of the modern world system we know today.28 Bredbenner’s essay in this roundtable, with its emphasis on peace women’s democratic activism, is another good example of this sort of work. Her essay fits neatly with both the transnational turn in historiography and new ways of grappling with historical memory that emphasize institutions and new connections. In particular, her essay links the aftermath of the war to actions going on before and during the conflict to demonstrate how no simple “inter-war years” construct can account for the flourishing of the international peace movement. Along similar lines, we see in Lentz-Smith’s essay a contested and deliberate construction of wartime memory, and history, to generate a usable past linking warfront and homefront in African American service that served to mobilize propaganda toward ending Jim Crow segregation.

After the end of the Cold War, in the 1990s, questions about the United States’ role in both world wars and about the guiding principles in America’s twentieth-century foreign policy led historians to renew their interest in Woodrow Wilson. There is a consensus among historians that Wilson’s WWI-era progressivism and internationalism, so-called “Wilsonianism,” decisively shaped the course of American domestic and foreign policy history. Writing in 1999, Frank Ninkovich argued that Wilson’s presidency marked a shift in American foreign relations: after Wilson left the White House in 1921, Ninkovich asserted, the dominant paradigm for active United States–world engagement generated a “Wilsonian Century.” Critics have made the same sort of case, including Henry Kissinger, who once lamented the survival of Wilsonianism.29

In the wake of the attacks on September 11, 2001 — as the United States repositioned and began to take on a unilateralist and interventionist stance in foreign policy as part of a new “global war on terror,” embodied by the 2002 National Security Strategy (popularly known as the “Bush Doctrine”) of preemption — scholarly thought returned to Wilson, the Great War, and the aftermath of the conflict. One insight became clear: the “ghost of Woodrow Wilson” (his ideas, his vision, and the results of his policies) loomed over U.S. foreign policy and wartime planning during and after the Second World War and throughout the rest of the century. The rise of U.S. interventionism during the First World War as well as the United States’ role in international governance linked up to the new debates and directions in foreign relations. Scores of articles and books, including numerous biographies of Wilson, analyses of the League of Nations, and nuanced global historical studies, grapple with the ways Wilson and the United States’ role in the world were transformed during and after First World War.30

Contemporary events revive First World War-era conversations about who counts as a citizen; about the urgency of social, economic, and political change, regarding external and internal threats; and how the United States should respond in times of conflict and perceived crisis. Again we hear echoes of First World War issues of dissent, identity, patriotism, nationalism, and memory that endured and deepened into the 1920s and 1930s. Partisan divides, xenophobia, and fractures in democratic capitalism all lie in the long shadow of these final intellectual debates of the Progressive Era. Uncertainty about establishing and maintaining viable political coalitions again appears all more relevant, as it did to the African Americans, women, Indians, working class, and antiwar activists discussed in these roundtable essays.

Today, Americans, particularly on the political left, confront anew the pluralistic (and problematically majoritarian and divisive) nature of democracy, along with the unwillingness or unwieldiness of state structures and politics to address the needs of the nation’s disenfranchised and marginalized members. The arguments and developments detailed in these essays may give us hope and intellectual resources, but they also should be chastening. For this is a history that reminds us of what crises governance
and politics created and enabled in that era. They empowered the state, military, financial, and industrial elites, thereby centralizing power while disempowering workers, homogenizing and hyper-patriotizing much of the populace at the expense of progressive philosophies and education, undercutting institutions of higher education (to the point of firing dissenting faculty), and limiting free speech and civil liberties.

The current outcry for protest, reform, and engagement echoes both the Progressive Era platforms from early last century and the First World War experience. Responding to capitalist excess and corruption, and to the dramatic transformations wrought by urbanization, industrialization, technological change, and the wartime state, Americans of every type tried to find their own paths. Most fought to enhance democracy and secure social justice. But just what did that mean in the context of a nation undergoing massive socio-economic and political change and involved in a world war? Then, as now, a crucial question seems to endure: how can we balance the need for action to meet the immediate crisis with the need for careful, calm thought about long-term goals and the best way to achieve them?

Thanks to the authors of these essays, we can experience aspects of the intense conflict that shook the world from 1914 to 1918 and beyond on the local, national, and transnational levels. Concepts and practices of citizenship lay at the heart of these case studies. Their subjects confronted epochal questions of the status of individuals and communities in the nation and the world and their relationships with one another. Some of the subjects of these essays insisted on a constricted vision of citizenship limited by Whiteness, class, social and immigration status, and above all 100% loyalty to government war aims. Others envisioned and practiced a more capacious civic vision that included dissent and was open to all. The World War engendered restrictive immigration legislation, anti-alien land laws, and deportations of suspected radicals. It also fostered continuing movements for peace, the right to object and confront one’s government, and the civic empowerment of women, Americans of color, Indians, and members of immigrant communities. It is no wonder that the conflict saw the expansion of the civil-liberties and human-rights movements in the United States and beyond. Wartime links between service and loyalty to the state on the one hand, and dissent and conscientious objection on the other, charged debates about civic identity in the decades, and indeed the century, that followed.

We sense the profound ways that these experiences of the First World War resonate with our own lives and the complex questions of citizenship and belonging with which we grapple in today’s world. Many of the essays emphasize the destructive power of labeling people and groups as radical, seditionist, and slacker — in effect naming them as anti-citizens. Those who labeled and stereotyped sought to simplify complex questions and to objectify individuals. They hoped to inscribe into the past, present, and future a conformity in thought and action that was not part of the American tradition. Others depended on historical silences or one-sided narratives of the past to propel the nation into their vision of the postwar future. As Lentz-Smith observes in her essay, for example, ‘White supremacists “rehashed wartime rumors” of Black soldiers’ inferiority and their “danger” to White women “until repetition gave them the sheen of truth.”’ What these essays expose about the First World War reinforces the importance of the free flow of evidence-based information and critical thinking for public discourse, debate, and action in our own day. They underscore the need for historians to continue to uncover and analyze the multiplicity of voices and experiences in our past in dynamic, complicated, yet publicly accessible ways as we seek a just society in the present and future.

NOTES

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The Americans Who Opposed The Great War

Who They Were, What They Believed

by Michael Kazin

THE UNITED STATES has been at war, whether abroad or at home, for most of its history. Millions of Americans opposed one or more of those conflicts, but they have received far less attention than the politicians who authorized the conflicts and the men (and, more recently, women) who instigated and waged them.

From the summer of 1914 to the early spring of 1917, a cross-section of American citizens tried to stop the nation from engaging in what became history’s most destructive war (until the second world conflict). After Congress declared war on Germany in April 1917, many peace activists endured the wrath of a government that — with the Espionage and Sedition acts — punished them for refusing to change their minds. They came from a variety of backgrounds: wealthy and middle and working class, recent immigrant and “old stock,” urban and rural, White and Black, Christian and Jewish and atheist. They lived in every region of the country and belonged to both major parties as well as the Socialist Party, then in its heyday. Most wanted to make big changes in American society, although not always the same changes and not always by expanding the powers of the state. But they shared a profound revulsion toward the conflict that was taking the lives of millions of soldiers and civilians in Europe and the Middle East. In print and in person, they urged President Woodrow Wilson to help stop the carnage rather than join one side in order to vanquish the other.

Until the United States entered the war, those activists organized the largest, most diverse, and most sophisticated peace coalition to that point in U.S. history. Not until the movement to end the Vietnam War half a century later would there be as large, as influential, and as tactically adroit a campaign against U.S. intervention in another land. There has been none to rival it since.

Cosmopolitan Socialists and feminists worked closely with members of Congress from the small-town South and the agrarian Midwest. They mounted street demonstrations and popular exhibitions, founded such new organizations as the Woman’s Peace Party and the American Union Against Militarism, attracted prominent leaders from the labor and suffrage movements, and ran peace candidates for local and federal office. For almost three years, they helped prevent Congress from authorizing a massive increase in the size of the U.S. Army, a step that, under the name of “preparedness,” was advocated by some of the richest and most powerful men in the land — ex-president Theodore Roosevelt foremost among them. Anti-war leaders met often in the White House with Wilson. Usually, he assured them he also wanted the United States to remain neutral, so that he might broker an equitable peace.

The relationship between articulate activists dedicated to stopping U.S. involvement in the Great War and a president who claimed to share their lofty goals was critical to the peace coalition’s strategy. By arguing that they only wanted America’s actions to live up to Wilson’s rhetoric, the anti-militarists appealed to progressives in both parties. Until the president in the early spring of 1917 asked Congress to declare war, most members of the peace alliance took him at his word. In the end, their credulousness probably hindered their ability to oppose him forthrightly when that became necessary.
What the advocates of peace were able to achieve depended on a coalition of four major parts. One individual in each group spoke out most prominently for its grievances and visions. Morris Hillquit, a suave labor lawyer, played that role for the Socialist Party as well as for left-wing trade unionists. Crystal Eastman, a professional organizer with charisma and prodigious energy, spearheaded the efforts of feminists and liberal pacifists, many of whom, such as Jane Addams, were famous and well connected. In the House of Representatives, the Majority Leader — Claude Kitchin from North Carolina — rallied dozens of his fellow Democrats to arrest the drift toward war and, at times, to oppose the president and leader of their own party. Over in the Senate, Robert La Follette of Wisconsin spoke out, with combative eloquence, for many like-minded Republicans and Democrats from the Midwest and West, including Oregon’s own Senator Harry Lane, who suspected that big businessmen with close ties to Great Britain were pushing the United States to enter the conflict. This combination of movement activists outside government and lawmakers backing them inside the halls of federal power gave the anti-war cause a breadth and influence neither contingent could have achieved alone.

These leaders of the peace coalition did not agree about every key issue that roiled the nation. Kitchin opposed woman suffrage and was a stalwart defender of the Jim Crow laws that kept Black people down. Only Hillquit was ready to abolish private enterprise. But all four believed that industrial corporations wielded too much sway over how Americans worked and what they earned, the taxes they had to pay, the officeholders they elected, and the future of the economy on which they depended. And all four were convinced that the men at the helm of American industry and finance (most of whom were Republicans) were eager to use war and preparations for war to augment their profits and power.

They also agreed that going to war would change American society forever. When the United States abandoned its neutral stance, war also brought about “the health of the state,” as the eloquent young critic Randolph Bourne famously wrote just before his death from influenza in 1918. The apparatus of repressing “disloyalty” was merely one tentacle of the newly potent Leviathan. Wilson’s government created the first military draft since the Civil War, a War Industries Board and a War Labor Board, public corporations to finance shipbuilding and construct barracks, and a new bureau to regulate the production and consumption of food. It nationalized the railroads for the duration of the conflict and turned such private organizations as the Red Cross and the YMCA into virtual appendages of the military. Taken together, these changes fostered a new kind of political obligation — not to one’s community or local government but to the national state, whose power radiated out to the world from the growing city of four hundred thousand, located at the confluence of the Potomac and Anacosta rivers.

To resist these changes was a conservative act, in the literal sense of the word. It meant standing athwart the transformation of one’s country and yelling “Stop!” — to paraphrase how William F. Buckley, Jr., would later summarize his own traditionalist credo. In the fall of 1917, Bourne recognized that “war determines its own end — victory, and government crushes out automatically all forces that deflect, or threaten to deflect, energy from the path of organization to that end.”

The women and men who faced jail by continuing to protest retained their conviction in what Bourne called the “American promise”; they clung to the braided ideals of individual liberty, global comity, and mass democracy that had inspired the peace coalition in the first place. This big, perhaps utopian, vision had always been their moral equivalent of combat; they would not abandon it after the nation had, in the name of Americanism, plunged into the greatest war in history. But peace activists understood that, as long as the conflict continued, resisting it would yield them more hardships than victories.

**ANTI-WAR MOVEMENTS** are not like other collective attempts to change society. In contrast to those who seek to win rights and a measure of power for women or workers or people of color or gays and lesbians, peace organizers have no natural constituency. Neither can their movement grow slowly, taking decades to convince ordinary people and elites to think differently and enact laws to embody that new perspective. A massive effort to stop one’s country from going to war — or to stop a war it is already waging — has to grow quickly or it will have little or no influence. What is more, it has to lure talented activists away from other, more enduring political commitments. Every new war also requires peace activists to create a new movement and then to find partners for a coalition that might be capable of ending it. There have always been pacifists in the United States. But during periods of peace or brief conflicts, they endure on the margins, unknown to most of their fellow citizens.

The Americans who fought a war against war from the summer of 1914 until the Armistice fifty-one months later managed to surmount all these obstacles. They were unable to convince the president and Congress to keep the nation at peace. But their legacy is not simply one of failure. By warning, credibly, about the consequences of American intervention, they were transformed from “traitors” into something akin to prophets. William Stone, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and one of six senators who voted against going to war with Germany, was quite accurate when he predicted at the time that if the United States intervened in the conflict, “we would never again have the same old republic.” A few decades later, when the United States became the strongest military power in world history, many Americans continued to question how that force was being used and the assaults on civil liberties that often accompanied it. Consciously or not, they were echoing the same question posed by dissidents during the First World War: Can one preserve a peaceful and democratic society at home while venturing into the world to kill those whom our leaders designate, rationally or not, as our enemies?
Resistance, Dissent, and Punishment in WWI Oregon

by Michael Helquist

GEORGE W. FRANCE, a twenty-six-year-old storekeeper and postmaster in the small community of Tenmile in Douglas County, dared to question why the United States became a combatant in World War I. For that, he became the first Oregonian indicted for disloyal acts during the war years. He was charged with violation of the recently enacted Espionage Act after distributing to young men a pamphlet entitled “War — What For?” He was convicted in Portland’s federal courthouse on August 29, 1917, and then sentenced to thirteen months at McNeil Island Federal Penitentiary in Washington State.1

Nearly one hundred Oregonians were arrested for dissent during the patriotic and political fervor that followed U.S. entry into the war on April 6, 1917. At President Woodrow Wilson’s bidding, the U.S. Congress enacted first the Espionage Act to prohibit spying and sabotage, and then the Sedition Act to outlaw dissent about the government and wartime industries. 2 At the same time, a federal office mounted a first-of-its-kind national campaign to enlist citizens in hyper-vigilant monitoring of neighbors, acquaintances, and colleagues to squelch any resistance or dissent. In my research, I found that two-thirds of the reports of sedition in Oregon were initiated by neighbors, colleagues, casual observers, and local officials.3 Although historians have profiled a few Oregonians charged with sedition, no comprehensive review exists of the suppression of dissent in the state during the WWI period.4 This brief account identifies many of the Oregonians arrested for dissent and describes the outcomes of their cases. This study is based on a digital version of the Oregonian as its primary data source. The newspaper was the state’s largest during the WWI era, and it considered reporting seditious incidents a duty to its readers.5 As a result, the Oregonian published nearly two-hundred accounts of disloyal incidents involving ninety-nine men and women from eighteen counties and twenty-four jurisdictions that ranged from small, unincorporated communities to the state’s cities.6

One-third of the arrested Oregonians represented the “usual suspects” — political radicals opposed to the war or to the economic system. Of these thirty-four individuals, twenty-nine were affiliated with the radical union, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). The number seems low for the seventeen months of the country’s war involvement, especially because federal authorities feared that Wobblies, as IWW members were called, would disrupt Oregon’s lumber industry, shipbuilding yards, and maritime trade — all essential to the war effort. Oregon was also served by aggressive U.S. district attorneys eager to prosecute every alleged seditious offense, and by two district judges who interpreted sedition broadly and instructed juries accordingly. One reason for the number of arrests might be a lack of federal agents in the state to pursue all the potential cases; another might be the priority for resources given to Washington State for its larger population of radicals and their greater disruption of wartime industries. Of Oregon’s thirty-four arrests of radicals, nineteen were reported to have led to convictions and prison sentences.8

The trial and conviction of Peter Green, a Wobbly arrested in Portland, exposed the compromised justice of many sedition trials. Green was secretary of the Lumber Workers Industrial Union, Local 500 in Portland. After his arrest, he was sent to Chicago to...
be tried in the IWW mass trial in 1918. Historian Stephen M. Kohn reveals an admission by the Department of Justice that no evidence had been presented in Green's trial to indicate that he had said or done anything against the war. Nevertheless, he was sentenced to ten years in prison with a staggering $30,000 fine. In July 1918, the U.S. Attorney arrested M.J. Smith, secretary of IWW local 400, and his companion, Kate Kidwell, for carrying literature about the IWW Chicago trial. A month later, Fred Zimmer was apprehended as he stepped off a downtown Portland streetcar by federal agents who had sought him for previous IWW efforts.

Marie Equi, a Portland physician and well-known agitator aligned with the IWW, became the only Oregon woman convicted of sedition. Her offenses included anti-war talks and objections to war drives that preyed on the working class, but her influence among the elite as well as the working class, and her notoriety as an abortion provider and lesbian, fueled more federal harassment and intimidation than usual. Agents wire-tapped her office, raided her home and office, tracked her every move, and questioned her friends and colleagues. Her trial became one of the most closely followed in Oregon. She was convicted and sentenced to three years in prison, and fined $3,000.

Although the Socialist Party in Oregon was less of a threat to wartime industries than the IWW, local and federal officials worried about the Socialists’ electoral strength in the state. One of the five Socialists arrested in Oregon was Floyd Ramp, a thirty-five-year-old Roseburg attorney who studied law at the University of Oregon. Ramp represented himself in his trial and failed to convince a jury that his anti-war comments did not make him disloyal. He was convicted, sentenced to two years in prison, and fined $1,000.

Two-thirds of the Oregonians arrested included nine religious objectors, twelve enemy aliens, and forty-four “unaligned dissenters” who were ordinary citizens without radical or religious affiliations. Many simply questioned the purpose of the war, the draft, or the obligation to subscribe to the many war-related drives such as the Liberty Loan campaigns. Some made intemperate remarks while under the influence of alcohol, while others suffered the vindictiveness of neighbors or relatives. A few men of German descent unwisely professed their fondness for, or allegiances to, their home country. These Oregonians were often simply expressing comments and complaints about national affairs. When they did so in writing, in public, or in leaflets, they risked being reported to authorities by vigilance-minded citizens who collaborated with the national surveillance and policing regimen.

Julius Rhuberg, a prosperous German-American farmer of Sherman County near the town of Moro, was convicted and sentenced to fifteen months in prison and fined $2,000. His offense was to suggest to two enlisted men that German troops were superior to U.S. forces and that they should surrender to them. Several jury members believed Rhuberg was an old man set in his ways who posed no threat to the nation, but he was readily convicted in a second trial. Dr. Nels J. Lund, a Swedish native and a house physician at St. Vincent Hospital in Portland, complained in a letter to a friend about Liberty Loan bonds and the shipbuilding industry. For that he was reported, arrested, and investigated.

The surveillance and intimidation of dissenters made clear to Oregonians — radicals and non-radicals alike — that they and their families had reason to fear for their privacy, freedom, reputations, and livelihoods if the government questioned their political beliefs, activities, and affiliations. As Oregon’s District Judge Robert S. Bean advised in one of his rulings, “All the government asked was that those who did not [support the war] keep quiet.” For many Oregonians, it was not so simple. They believed dissent benefited the nation and protected its values, especially in time of war. At the least, they asserted a right to speak out and resist any advice to “keep quiet.”

THE U.S. ATTORNEY in Portland declared Marie Equi, pictured above, “the very worst agitator we have in town.” Convicted of sedition, Equi served nearly ten months in San Quentin State Prison.
World War I and the Northwest’s Working Class

by Steven C. Beda

WHEN THE Oregon Historical Quarterly announced this special section and sent out the request for article proposals, I was immediately drawn to the editors’ specific request for pieces examining the ways World War I reshaped workers’ radicalism and relationship to the state. In part, this is because I am a Northwest labor historian, and questions about workers, radicalism, and the state fall squarely in my research wheelhouse. But more than that, these questions interest me because they belie easy answers, as the most interesting and important historical questions often do. The reason there are no easy answers here is because America has never had a single working class. Race, ethnicity, gender, birthplace, occupation, skill-level, geography, and politics have long divided American workers. This has been especially true in the Pacific Northwest because the region’s major early-twentieth-century industries — logging, commercial fishing, and shipbuilding — tended to draw a racially and ethnically diverse group of workers. So labor historians, and Northwest labor historians in particular, rarely talk about America’s working class but rather its working classes.

Workers in the Northwest, as elsewhere, had been divided long before World War I, but those lines of division hardened and became more salient during the war. This division had everything to do with the wartime expansion of the state and, more specifically, the ways White workers leveraged wartime state power in their own interests. Skilled White shipyard workers came to rely on wartime bureaucracies to both expand their bargaining power and exclude workers of color. At the same time as the wartime state granted native-born, White, unionized shipyard workers new privileges, it met immigrant working-class radicalism with repression and violence. In other words, the World War I state legitimized or delegitimized labor radicalism in new ways that were contingent on race and ethnicity. World War I is not the sole cause of a fractured American working class, but the state’s use of wartime powers to reinforce racial, ethnic, and gender lines is a major source of division in American and Northwest labor history.

When the United States entered the war in 1917, both the Naval and commercial fleets were woefully ill-equipped, and the federal government immediately began an aggressive and unprecedented shipbuilding program. Normally overnight, this effort transformed Northwest shipbuilding from a minor to a major industry and created an immediate demand for shipyard workers. The government’s need for ships gave those workers a great deal of bargaining power. If they stopped working, the U.S. Navy might very well lose the war. Building a ship required specific knowledge of metallurgy and riveting, plumbing and pipefitting. The men who flocked to Seattle and Portland shipyards during World War I had spent years, if not decades, accruing these skills, meaning they were not easily replaced.1

Skilled, White, male workers’ monopoly on the shipbuilding trades had allowed shipyard workers to demand concessions from employers in earlier decades, but those concessions were often slowly won. World War I, and more specifically a new wartime bureaucracy — the National War Labor Board, established in 1918 to oversee labor-management relations — changed this dynamic. When it came to shipbuilding, the board had only one goal: keep the shipyards working. Shipyard workers quickly discovered that they merely had to threaten a work

WORKERS AT THE Grant Smith-Porter Ship Company in Portland, Oregon, are pictured here in front of hull number 1356, a cargo ship, in July 1918.
stoppage and the board would immediately pressure employers to grant whatever they were demanding. The board also strongly discouraged employers from fighting workers on union recognition; over the course of the war, most shipyard unions doubled or tripled in size. Shipyard workers translated this new power into gains for other workers as well. Workers threatening a strike in another industry merely had to get a shipbuilder’s union to threaten a sympathy strike, and the board would intervene and force employers to grant concessions. The board, in short, legitimized labor radicalism for skilled workers, and skilled workers used that legitimacy to demand more from their employers, expand their unions, and create new networks of solidarity. As Seattle shipyard worker John Williamson remembered, “the workers were astir with a new feeling of strength and the realization of their power.”

But whether a worker was included in this new solidarity depended entirely on his gender and relationship to the color line. The shipyard unions were affiliates of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), and most AFL union leaders believed that women and unskilled, non-White, and foreign-born male workers diluted labor’s prestige and therefore its power. So, while AFL shipbuilding unions were using the War Labor Board to expand their bargaining power, they were also using the board to expand the native-born, White, male monopoly on skilled work. Over the course of the war, both the Seattle and Portland Central Labor Councils pressured the board to bar Black and Japanese workers from the shipyards.

Unions in non-wartime industries used their new relationship with shipyard unions to enact the same exclusions, thereby re-segregating many occupations that had previously been integrated. And while skilled shipbuilding unions were quick to threaten a sympathy strike to help expand the bargaining power of White male workers in trades outside the shipyards, they were decidedly less enthusiastic about supporting the unionization efforts of women who worked as waitresses, switchboard operators, and seamstresses.

In addition to reinforcing the racial lines between workers, the wartime state reinforced boundaries between immigrant and native-born workers. This effect can be most clearly seen in the Northwest logging, work overwhelmingly done by Scandinavian and eastern European immigrants. When the war began, immigrant loggers belonging to the radical Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) made many of the same assumptions that their brethren in the shipyards had made. Lumber, like ships, was crucial to the war effort, and the loggers believed they could leverage their position in the wartime economy to expand their power. But the state would be far less tolerant of immigrant working-class radicalism. When loggers across the Northwest struck in the summer of 1917, the state did not pressure employers to increase wages and meet workers’ demands, as it had done in the shipyards, but sent in the Army, which suppressed the strike, imprisoned the IWW’s leaders, and took control of lumber production.

These patterns continued in the war’s aftermath. During the 1919 Seattle General Strike, which began when shipyard workers struck over wages and then convinced most of the city’s unions to go along with them, the state was unusually tolerant. To be perfectly clear, the strike elicited upper-class fears and the state of Washington mobilized the National Guard to monitor the strike. Those troops never unslung their rifles, however, and the state allowed the strike to proceed and eventually falter on its own accord.

Meanwhile, throughout the summer of 1919, the Justice Department initiated raids on IWW halls throughout the Northwest, arresting the union’s leaders and deporting its immigrant members. In November 1919, when members of the American Legion raided an IWW hall in Centralia, Washington, and lynched one of the union’s members, state authorities turned a blind eye.

The Centralia massacre was just the beginning of tacit state endorsement of vigilantism aimed at policing immigrant radicalism in the years after the war. In the Northeast, state involvement could be seen most clearly in Oregon’s Ku Klux Klan. Oregon’s twentieth-century Klan had formed before the war, but it grew exponentially afterward. By the 1920s, it even became difficult to separate the Klan from the White skilled-labor movement. Throughout the 1920s, unions across the country passed referenda denouncing the Klan. The Oregon AFL was nearly alone in refusing to issue a condemnation of Klan vigilantism. In turn, the Klan openly supported Oregon’s AFL. As the Klan’s Oregon newspaper explained in 1923, the KKK “stands four-square and uncompromisingly for the rights of labor as upheld by the A.F. of L.”

The lynchings and attacks on immigrant communities perpetuated by the Oregon Klan throughout the 1920s indicated a new axis of repression that had coalesced during the war, one in which White supremacists, White skilled workers, and the state were aligned against immigrant, Black, and Asian workers. These lines had existed before, but as the violence of postwar vigilantism suggests, by war’s end, the lines had become more salient, and the consequences for transgressing them more dire. These lines continued to shape American and Northwest labor history for the remainder of the twentieth century, and could again be seen in attacks on Communists in the 1930s, in New Deal labor legislation that benefited White workers and excluded women and workers of color, in Cold War labor policy that once again falsely conflated immigration and radicalism, and in job and housing segregation in Seattle and Portland. Echoes of this history can still be heard today, in the racist and xenophobic rhetoric of Oregon militia movements, on up to the president’s call for a border wall.
Indispensable Histories

by Adriane Lentz-Smith

WHEN AFRICAN AMERICAN camp worker Kathryn Johnson spoke of World War I, she could summon either wonder or outrage. Serving in Europe with the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) offered Black Americans an opportunity to see beyond American racial regimes, even as segregationists in the Wilson Administration and the military ensured that those regimes traveled abroad as well. After two years of watching Black soldiers withstand “injustices that seared their souls like hot iron,” Johnson joined with her fellow YMCA volunteer Addie Hunton to document battlefield heroics and the superhuman efforts of men in the labor battalions, while also collecting stories of Black soldiers demoted for being too proud and killed for talking to White women.¹ Convinced that no history of the war would treat African Americans fairly “unless some colored person wrote it,” Johnson and Hunton produced a memoir, Two Colored Women with the American Expeditionary Forces (1920), which offered a testament to both Johnson and Hunton’s courage and to the tribulations of troops fighting a brutal war while hamstrung by Jim Crow.²

Defenders of White democracy also saw the memory of the war as a field of battle. Soldiers opposed to Black participation in the AEF began smearing African American troops even before most had returned to the United States.³ One high-ranking White officer in the segregated 92nd Infantry Division claimed in late 1918 that Black soldiers had “been dangerous to no one but themselves and women.”⁴ White supremacists continued their campaign into the 1920s, rehashing war-time rumors until repetition gave them the sheen of truth. In 1925, retired Gen. Robert Lee Bullard declared in his memoirs that African American combat troops were “hopelessly inferior” and had amassed more charges of rape than acts of courage. He also warned against continuing to use them because fighting with

African Americans would always “be swamped in the race question.”⁵ Responding to the book, the editors of the Black newspaper the Pittsburgh Courier decried Bullard’s reminiscences as distortions, memories “poisoned with Negrophobia” and designed to forestall Black activism. Dismissing Bullard as “a cracker of the first water,” the Courier challenged him to “get the war record” to bone up on more accurate accounts of Black soldiers’ performance.⁶

African American writers deliberately maintained that war record, cognizant that White supremacists’ mastery of “the Propaganda of History”⁷ — as W.E.B. Du Bois would later dub it — served as an ideological underpinning of Jim Crow, and they worked to generate a Black counter-memory of the war.⁸ As would later generations of civil rights activists, Black writers used the international context to hold a mirror to America: they presented a France of genuine republican values in contrast to the United States, a France where liberty, equality, and fraternity shaped African Americans’ encounter. Neither the
White supremacist nor the Black activist depictions captured the texture and complexity of social relations in imperial France, and neither really tried to do so. For Americans writing about race and World War I, France functioned as an expression of possibility — whether a model or a warning.

Writers like Du Bois and Howard University’s Emmett Scott wrote histories more fair than balanced. The former advisor to the Secretary of War, Scott opened his book with a tribute from AEF commander General John J. Pershing, and later used Pershing’s observation that “colored combat troops . . . exhibit a fine capacity for quick training and eagerness for the most dangerous work” to rebut Bollard.10 In his writing, Du Bois rattled off the numerous war medals won by Black troops and noted that only fourteen members of the division had faced court martial for rape by early 1919, with half of those acquitted and three more convicted of simple assault. Moreover, he asserted, despite White officers’ smear campaign, the French preferred “the courtesy and bonhomie of the Negroes to the impudence and swagger of many of the whites.”11 As White supremacists in the Army revived old tropes of Black inferiority and criminality, Black writers countered with portraits of moral authority, courage, and charm.

Yet histories of the war were not simply defenses of Black men and women’s honor; they were also calls to action. Journalist W.A. Sweeney captured the sentiment of numerous other writers when he described his war history as “an arraignment, a warning and a prophecy . . . that a NEW day is dawning; HAS dawned for the Negro in America.”12 Hunton and Johnson were even more explicit in their introduction, arguing that “justice and truth” continued to “call loudly for the democracy for which we have paid,” civilians and soldiers, women and men. If the world were ever “to be free from the murderous scourge called war,” then White Americans would have to embrace the common humanity denied by White supremacy. They would have to “make universal and eternal . . . the brotherhood of man.”13 No justice, they warned, no peace.

Johnson and Hunton ensured that front and home front were never far apart in Black Americans’ war for democracy. Novelist Jessie Fauset described Two Colored Women as “a guidebook to memory” for ex-soldiers and “indispensable” to African Americans who had remained stateside. In a war defined by the mobilizing power of propaganda, the book’s intimacy and “marvelling sadness” made it “propaganda of the most effective sort.”14 That propaganda, rooted in Black political traditions of witness and telos, was a deliberate intervention designed to shape the historical record and the American memory of the war — and to portray the end of Jim Crow as inevitable. Contesting history was contesting power, and the pen, in this case, was as mighty as the sword.

“TRUE SONS OF FREEDOM,” published in 1918, shows African American soldiers fighting German soldiers during World War I. Designed as a recruitment poster, the image of Abraham Lincoln looking over the battlefield was intended to inspire African Americans by drawing parallels to the struggle for freedom during the Civil War.
In Search of Citizenship

The Society of American Indians and the First World War

by Steven Sabol

In Early April 1911, a small group of concerned activists and reformers gathered at Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio, to organize a new society devoted to promoting “all progressive movements of the North American Indians” and the “advancement of the Indian in enlightenment which makes him free . . . to develop according to the natural laws of social evolution.”1 By October of that year, the Society of American Indians (SAI), fully organized, held its first conference and quickly moved to the forefront of advocacy for American Indian rights, education, and citizenship.

Within two years of its founding, SAI had more than two hundred members, held conferences in Wisconsin and Washington, D.C. (and planned more annual gatherings), and started to publish a journal, The Quarterly Journal of the Society of American Indians, edited by Arthur C. Parker. In 1916, the journal changed its name to The American Indian Magazine, with Parker still at the helm, and it appeared regularly until 1920. Under Parker’s strong editorial hand, the journal focused on education and citizenship, and was the principal means to disseminate SAI’s agenda and vision.2 The SAI insistence on citizenship, according to K. Tsianina Lomawaima, emanated from its “belief in individual Indian’s rights to full, valued contribution to the nation’s social, economic, and political life.”3 Subsequent scholarship devoted to the study of SAI has not always been generous in its praise. Hazel Hertzberg’s 1971 book, The Search for an American Indian Identity, for example, concluded that SAI was “a town meeting of educated English-speaking Indians rather than a representative confederation of tribes.”4 Despite Hertzberg’s conclusion, SAI’s work was undoubtedly significant in persuading the U.S. Congress to enact citizenship for all American Indians in the immediate post-war years.

When the United States finally declared war on Germany in April 1917, SAI reacted ardently to the country’s military need. Its journal and leaders instructed readers and supporters that the United States consistently “upheld the principles of human liberty, political equality and universal justice and she has invited to her hospitable shores the millions of the world who needed a land of opportunity and has schooled them in those principles.”5 It concluded with the challenge: “Already we hear the tread of feet that once wore moccasins; already the red men are enlisting. Let this, then, be a personal question, ‘Have you done your share?’”6 American society was decidedly divided about the nation’s entry into the war, a fact that demonstrated itself frequently during the conflict and the months that followed the cessation of hostilities. Clearly, the majority of Americans supported the war effort and committed fully to prosecuting it until the end, but dissent was frequently on display — although rarely among American Indians, on the reservations or within non-reservation communities. American Indians supported the war, and the American government through the Office of Indian Affairs proudly proclaimed that their support illustrated the success of assimilationist policies. Those proclamations, however, also masked concerns many Indians voiced that revealed the continued distrust they held toward the American government.7

Senior government officials, military officers, and others debated the use of American Indians in the armed forces during the decades before the war, which ended with the decision to enlist Indians into fully integrated rather than segregated units, as was the case with Black service members. The question of connecting military service and citizenship was rarely a part of government authorities’ discussions before the war. In fact, the question of American Indian citizenship continually befuddled American leaders throughout the late nineteenth century and remained unresolved until after the war.
Scholars generally agree that between 12,000 and 17,000 American Indians served, either having enlisted or been conscripted, in the American armed services during the First World War. Selective service and enlistment ran smoothly, albeit at some stations with an occasional degree of confusion, which local officials usually resolved by accepting the Indian’s draft status rather than rejecting it due to the absence of citizenship. According to Russell Lawrence Barsh, the American Indian who enlisted in 1917 differed little from his White counterpart: they spoke English, went to movies, played sports, and attended federal schools. It was, Barsh observed, “a great public demonstration of Americanism and patriotism orchestrated, to no small degree, by Indian political leaders and White Indian-rights activists. Indians’ first modern war was a commitment to being modern and American.”

American Indians served honourably and heroically on the Western Front, side-by-side with their White counterparts. SAI and White reformers, such as the Indian Rights Association (IRA), pestered elected officials for the duration of the war to acknowledge the Indians’ contributions and bestow citizenship, Writing in 1919, Matthew K. Sniffen, the secretary of the IRA, urged Congress to act, insisting that the “time has come when all Indians should be under the same law that governs whites; when they should enjoy all the rights of that democracy which they have helped maintain.”

As Congress moved slowly forward on this legislation, divisions among SAI’s leadership fractured the organization further. Many members, such as Montezuma, believed that full citizenship and individual and tribal sovereignty were only possible if the government also abolished the Office of Indian Affairs (OIA); however, many others, particularly those who worked for the BIA, argued that the agency protected American Indian land and tribal rights from greedy Whites and speculators. While many tribes supported efforts to grant citizenship, others opposed it vigorously. Some, such as the Iroquois, Seneca, and Chippewa, argued that American citizenship might easily consume distinctive indigenous sovereignty and further eviscerate American Indians’ cultural, social, and political identities.

In 1919, Congress granted Indian veterans the opportunity to petition for citizenship, but the effort was poorly promoted. According to documentation among Indian vets compiled by Joseph Dixon, most Indians were unaware that the option existed. Few eligible men applied. Secretary of the Interior Frank Lane enthusiastically endorsed the legislation. He claimed “the controlling factor in granting citizenship to Indians” is that “they are real Americans, and are of the right entitled to citizenship.” Five years later, the U.S. Congress revisited the issue, finally passing legislation that granted citizenship to all American Indians born in the United States.

It is somewhat unclear why the U.S. Congress in 1924 finally passed legislation that granted full citizenship to all Indians. The general assumption, echoed by scholars and others in the decades since the war ended, was that Congress passed the law to reward Indians for their service and commitment to the country at a time of great need. By 1924, however, SAI had collapsed, splintered into factions and torn by internal enmities. Nonetheless, its steadfast support during the war for Indian enlistment, service, and domestic contributions (such as Liberty Loans, Red Cross donations, and supplying the government with essential labor and materials) positively influenced politicians and others to enact the reforms that SAI ardently promoted. In addition, the individual efforts of Arthur C. Parker (Seneca), Carlos Montezuma (Yavapai-Apache), Sherman Coolidge (Arapaho), Charles Eastman (Dakota), Laura Cornelius Kellogg (Oneida), Gertrude Bonnin (Dakota), Robert De Poe (Klamath), and numerous White reformers, such as John Collier and Fayette Avery McKenzie, kept the issue before congressional leaders. In many ways, American Indians who served, and their reasons for doing so, can be summed up by what one Indian explained to Joseph Dixon: “I went to do my share, and that share was to end the war and give liberty to all people, especially my people.”

**NATIVE AMERICAN SOLDIERS** from the 2nd Battalion, 358 Infantry, 90th Division at Camp Devins, Massachusetts, in June 1919. This photograph is part of a collection of images taken by Dr. Joseph Dixon to document Native Americans during World War I. The soldiers pictured include members of the Chippewa, Choctaw, Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Seminole tribes.
Power to the People

American Peace Women’s Democratic Cures for War

by Candice Bredbenner

IN 1920, Americans could celebrate the arrival of a decade free from the threat or grip of world war. But the “Great War” had shattered the old world order, leaving the American public to contemplate the implications of the new internationalism and their government’s role as a global power-broker. There were major and related political changes to ponder on the domestic front as well. After decades of suffrage campaigning, American women had finally secured the vote nationally. Many American progressives welcomed these developments with characteristic optimism. As pacifist and feminist Florence Brewer Boeckel exuberantly announced, “at the very moment in history when ‘the world was born,’ when it was recognized as a single whole . . . women were born politically.”

Inspired by this rendering of the new political landscape, American peace women launched into what remains the most ambitious undertaking in the nation’s chronicles of women’s activism: the campaign to make World War I the last war in United States history. Women, they reasoned, finally possessed both the political capital and the organizational strength to achieve what had been an elusive goal; and the feminist movement would be a trusted ally, having found “its clearest, soundest, and most characteristic utterance in the effort to abolish war.”

At no time in the histories of the movements for women’s rights and world peace had the two causes appeared more closely aligned and the underlying commitments they shared more compelling. Some of the loftiest aspirations and arguments of the interwar peace movement would be ridiculed by contemporaries as hopelessly naive or dangerously misguided. Nevertheless, the extensive and intensiveness of the peace efforts undertaken across those two decades remain unmatched by any subsequent generation of American associational women. Although not immune to internal disagreements over strategies and objectives, the interwar peace movement’s emphasis on women’s empowerment as citizens and on the uplifting of demo-
dent freedom that women sought to take hold of, as the progress of their campaigns against the war was faltering. Women's organizations increasingly turned their attention to domestic concerns, such as suffrage and labor reforms, as they grappled with the challenges of a new civic universe.

As the editor of the progressive Survey magazine remarked candidly, “being for Peace is apparently not nearly as simple and uniform as being for ‘votes for women’.”3 The United States’ section of the WILPF, founded by Jane Addams and Emily Greene Balch during the war, attracted pacifists and others devoted to the ideals of peace and social justice. The Women’s Peace Union (WPU), formed in 1921, spoke for that minority of female peace activists seeking not only a pacifist circle of women but one that fully embraced the absolutists’ credo of non-resistance.4

In the interwar years, these female peace networks labored to position the American public as a democratic bulwark against war by casting governments as the instigators of international conflict and “the people” as a pacific and counterbalancing force. As Florence Brewer Boeckel cannily observed, the abolition of war seemed a far more practical object once the problem of war was attributed primarily to government agency, not to self-destructive human impulses. “No one doubts the possibility of changing government policies,” she explained blithely — especially in a country like the United States, where “public opinion can be easily translated into government action.”5

Most of this pro-democracy peace work by women’s groups relied on familiar outreach strategies, including building public understanding of global politics through editorials and articles in their associational publications and popular print media. The NCCCW was particularly proud of its “Marathon Round Tables,” designed to encourage community-based discussion on national defense issues and, ultimately, to coax an anti-war public into becoming the country’s most potent weapon for peace.6 The non-resisters of the WPU preferred a more terminal solution to the country’s encounters with war. If these conflicts were understood as the tragic excesses of governments unconstrained by the wills and interests of their people, then a bold reinvestment in democracy, especially one led by the people of the United States, could spark a popular movement for peace globally. So, the WPU challenged the federal government to pledge never to send the United States into war, demanding that Americans be freed from this “form of slavery.”7 For these peace activists, popular sovereignty was not just a theoretical abstraction, but an untapped force to deploy in an existential conflict.

From 1926 to 1939, Rep. Lynn Frazier of North Dakota faithfully introduced the WPU’s constitutional proposal, which carried the unflinching declaration that “war for any purpose shall be illegal.”8 The WILPF also supported the Frazier amendment, albeit not with the zeal of the WPU. Nevertheless, having endorsed the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, the league also promoted a constitutional amendment that would require a popular referendum on the question of whether to declare war.9 In the last conflict, only a majority of men, including some never subject to a military draft, could instruct their government by vote on such weighty matters. But the proposed war referendum established women’s constitutional standing to exercise that authority and more — and in a policy area historically impervious to their influence. The ratification of such an amendment would have represented a major political coup, not just for the peace movement but for women’s rights as well.10

The referendum proposal also held its appeal beyond pacifist circles, both before and after the world war. A Gallup poll in 1937 found that a surprising 73 percent of those surveyed supported a popular referendum on war.11 Given the buoyancy of peace feminists’ interwar optimism about the prospects of their democratic agenda, World War II seems a particularly brutal repudiation of their hopes and plans.12 Yet, peace women’s audacious belief in the political salience of the people is worth recalling, especially at a time when many Americans are again looking to reassert the insurgent power of their voice.
“The Americans Who Opposed the Great War: Who They Were, What They Believed” by Michael Kazin

1. For a detailed list, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wars_involving_the_United_States (accessed March 27, 2017).


4. Ibid., 329.


“Resistance, Dissent, and Punishment in WWI Oregon” by Michael Helquist


2. Although the Espionage Act, passed on May 16, 1918, was meant to primarily address spying and sabotage, federal authorities also engaged in militant actions on a scale far larger than Wobblies, but they kept quiet about their war dissent. Kazin, The War Against War: The American Fight for Peace, 1914–1918 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017), 250.


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12. The other women arrested on sedition charges were M.A. Thomas and Eisey Osborne, who had distributed books by the anti-war pastor Charles T. Russell, Kate Bichaly of Klamath Falls, described as a Socialist agitator whose public talks prompted accusations of seditious talk (she was later released); Anna M. Weston, about whom little is known; and Kate Kidwell charged with distributing flyers for Marie Equi’s defense (charges dropped for insufficient evidence).

13. Hequist, Marie Equi, 155–70, 171–79.


15. A prominent case was that of Henry Albere, wealthy Portland businessman who, while inebriated on a train in southwest Oregon, remarked on superior German abilities in combat. He was arrested, indicted, and found guilty, but his conviction was dismissed before he began his prison sentence. “Portland Millman Is Held as Pro-Hun,” Oregonian, October 22, 1918, 10.


17. “Physician Is Held Disloyal to U.S.,” Oregonian, August 25, 1918, 9. The outcome of his November 1918 trial was not reported.


“World War I and the Northwest’s Working Class” by Steven C. Beda


3. Frank, Purchasing Power, 30–34.

4. Steven C. Beda, “Landscapes of Solidarity: Timber Workers and the Making

5. For the story of the labor history, see Michael Kazin notes that nationally, AFL workers engaged in militant actions on a scale far larger than Wobblies, but they kept quiet about their war dissent. Kazin, The War Against War: The American Fight for Peace, 1914–1918 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017), 250.
8. Perhaps the most prominent example of the ways in which post-World War I labor policy disproportionately privileged White workers is the National Labor Relations Act, which made it easier for workers to organize unions. The legislation, however, did not apply to agricultural workers (who were predominately Black) or domestic workers (who were predominately female and Black).
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10. “Indispensable Histories” by Adriane Lentz-Smith

5. This was not a new tactic. After the Spanish-Cuban and Philippine Wars, for example, Theodore Roosevelt had painted Black Army regulars as cowards and shirkers in order to depict himself as the hero of San Juan Hill. See Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 38–39. In reality, one veteran of the Cuban campaign recalled, “the Spaniards were moving [the Rough Riders] down like grass” until the Black Regulars and other troops rescued them. See Ralph Matthews, “Roosevelt Too Bullheaded Says Oldest War Veteran,” Baltimore Afro-American, September 6, 1930, A20.

“In Search of Citizenship: The Society of American Indians and the First World War” by Steven Sabol

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2. Statement of Gertrude Franchot Tone before Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on Senate Joint Resolution 100, Constitutional Amendment Making War Legally Impossible, 69th Cong., 2d session, Jan. 22, 1927: 32.
5. Carrie Chapman Catt was the inspirational leader of the NCCCW. In the 1920s, the organizations regularly represented at the annual Conference on the Cause and Cure of War included the National League of Women Voters, American Association of University Women, General Federation of Women’s Clubs, National Board of the YWCA, National Council of Jewish Women, National Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, National Women’s Trade Union League, National Federation of Business and Professional Women’s Clubs, Council of Women for Home Missions, and Federation of Women’s Boards of Foreign Missions of North America.
6. The WPU was committed “to work against war and all forms of coercion by violence.” Elinor Byrns, “Violence and Killing Always Wrong,” September 1927. WPU members pledged the following: “I affirm that it is my intention never to aid in or sanction war, offensive or defense, international or civil, in any way, whether by making or handling munitions, subscribing to war loans, using my labor for the purpose of setting others free for war service, helping by money or work any relief organization which supports or condones war.” Women’s Peace Union Records, 1921–1940 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1999), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Reel 884.
8. The objective of the round tables was “To develop and clarify public opinion. To make public opinion function. To decide how organized opinion can protect the world from war.” Statement from “Marathon Round Tables 1934. The Evolving Foreign Policy of the United States,” Records of the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, 1920–1944, MC 765, Box 52, folder 1, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University. The NCCCW’s efforts in this regard were directed by the belief, fairly held, that public pressure had secured Congressional support for the Kellogg Brand Treaty.
10. The first of these WPU resolutions to receive a hearing was S.J.Res. 100, 69th Cong., 2nd sess., in 1927.
12. The amendment allowed an exception to this rule in the case of attack or invasion. The member of Congress most closely associated with this alternative in the 1930s was Louis Ludlow of Indiana. For testimony by WILPF members on the Ludlow Amendment, see remarks of Mary Williams and Dorothy Detzer, Hearing before House Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H. J. Res. 167, To Amend the Constitution With Respect to the Declaration of War, 72nd Cong., 1st sess., June 19, 1935: 44–45.
13. Not all political observers agreed that democratic nations were inherently more pacific. See Duncan Bell’s exploration of this and related arguments on the cure for war in “Before the democratic peace: Racial utopianism, empire and the abolition of war,” European Journal of International Relations 20 (September 2014): 647–70. Furthermore, if the referendum included only registered voters, it would have widened the power gap between White voters and disfranchised African Americans.